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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines accounts of law – and more particularly public international law – 
provided by Marxian scholarship.  It does so with the aim of revealing and analysing those 
aspects which can help build the conceptual framework necessary for the creation of a 
systematic, coherent and radical theory of the contemporary world order.  In order to be 
intellectually satisfying and practically useful, such a theory must be capable of addressing 
the relationships amongst law, state and economy at the global level, and accounting for 
the form, content, function and structure of the global legal order. 
 
Throughout, this thesis draws on a number of different traditions of legal, political and 
economic thought from American Legal Realism and French Structuralism to World Polity 
Theory and Pashukanite and Gramscian Marxism.  However, it seeks to highlight, in 
particular, those insights available from theorists whose works have hitherto failed to 
receive the attention they deserve within critical international legal scholarship because of 
their primary association with domestic legal or political criticism. 
 
The intention in doing so is to demonstrate the benefits of rejecting the a priori distinction 
between the domestic and international legal fields so common within orthodox legal 
scholarship on both sides of the divide.  What is hoped will be provided by such a rejection 
is the conceptual space for generating a theory relevant not simply to public international 
law but to every legal field and, thus, ‘the Law’ as a whole. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Defining the project 
 
Analytical scope: ‘roads not taken’ 
 
A thesis of this length could not hope to be comprehensive while maintaining the necessary 
robustness  of  analysis.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  clarify  what  this  thesis  does  not 
examine. 
 
It does not examine particular fields within international law (international criminal law, 
international humanitarian law, etc.), except by way of example, and avoids entanglement 
with  purely  doctrinal  debates.    There  is  already  an  abundance  of  literature  analysing 
‘black-letter’  international  law  and    so,  instead,  it  focuses  on  “the  ‘deep  grammar’  of 
international law”:
1 the background theories, practices and structures common to all its 
fields  of  which  individual  cases,  treaties  and  customary  rules  are  merely  the  material 
condensations.
2    While  seeking  to  avoid  a -historicism,  this  thesis  examines  only 
contemporary  international  law,  for  although  critical  histories  of  international  law  are 
valuable, it is not necessary for the purposes of this thesis to have more than a rough sketch 
of  what  such  a  history  might  look  like.
3   Although this thesis examines critical left 
scholarship and incorporates Marxian analyses, it does not engage in the various debates 
currently running within Marxism (whether over the existence of and reasons for global 
crises or stagnation, the relative importance of the ‘internal logic of capital’ and ‘class 
struggle’  in  economic  movement,  the  significance  of  distinct  forms  of  capital  – 
‘competitive’,  ‘monopoly’;  ‘industrial’,  ‘finance’;  etc.  –  or  the  role  of  the  military-
                                                           
1 Miéville, C. Between Equal Rights: a Marxist Theory of International Law (Pluto Press, London, 2006), p3 
2 This focus, though it may put off some practitioners, is important.  As Alan Hunt argues, “[t]here is no 
escape from theory; no conversations can be free of it.  The best that we can do is to be as self-conscious as 
possible about the assumptions and connection which we bring into our conversations”.  (Hunt, A. “The 
Critique of Law: What is ‘Critical’ about Critical Legal Theory?” Journal of Law and Society Vol. 14, No. 1 
(Spring, 1987), p9) 
3 Although there are few systematic histories of international law from either orthodox or critical 
perspectives, many orthodox textbooks begin with brief histories, such as Stephen Neff’s “A Short History of 
International Law” in Evans, M. (ed.) International Law (2
nd edn.) (Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006), 
pp29-55.  This is especially true of textbooks of particular fields of international law, in which this device is 
used to separate their subject matter from international law in general.  For a particularly interesting example 
of this in relation to (transnational) commercial law, see Goode, R., Kronke, H. And McKendrick, E. 
Transnational Commercial Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). 10 
 
industrial complex in accumulation), unless unavoidable.  Finally, this thesis is located 
within international legal scholarship and so will touch upon the fields of International 
(political) Relations and (global) Macro-economics only insofar as they are relevant to 
legal analyses. 
 
Conceptual perspective 
 
This thesis examines ‘critical’ accounts but seeks to build a ‘radical’ theory: the value of 
critical legal theory, as Alan Hunt explains, is its “deep sense of dissatisfaction with the 
existing state of legal scholarship... the prevailing orthodoxies in legal scholarship… the 
conservatism of the law schools and… the role played by law and legal institutions in 
modern society”.
4  However, writing in 1987, Hunt acknowledged that critical legal theory 
“has  now  been  around  sufficiently  long  that  it  must  soon  pass  beyond  the  stage  of 
debunking  and  trashing  orthodoxy…  [and]  grapple  with  the  problems  of  advancing  a 
distinguishable and working alternative”.
5  This project of moving beyond critique, which 
necessitates a radical approach, is not yet completed, and is thus what concerns this thesis. 
 
Radical,  however,  does  not  necessarily  mean  Marxist.    Theorists  working  from  other 
conceptual frameworks often share Marxists’ “determination to uncover the social relations 
expressed, mediated and obscured in legal categories”.
6  Marxism has itself been subject to 
a  number  of  prominent  and  powerful  (largely  poststructuralist)  critiques.    Structural 
Marxism (about which this thesis will engage in detail) in particular, as Alasdair Stewart 
explains, being “[s]ituated in the strange position of being unappealing to Marxists for [a 
perceived deficiency in its theory of class] and to non-Marxists for being Marxist... has 
suffered  from  a  lack  of  interest  in  recent  years”,
7 and  has  never  gained  a  significant 
                                                           
4 Hunt (1987), p5.  For a particularly good and far more detailed account – which weaves together the work 
of Max Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas, Robert Cox and Michel Foucault – of the benefits of critical theory 
(‘[which looks] at the world from the perspective of those who cannot be content with things as they are’) 
over ‘traditional’ or orthodox theory (‘which takes the world as it finds it’), see Susan Marks’s book The 
Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2000), pp125-146. 
5 Hunt (1987), p7.  Marks describes theory which simply debunks and trashes orthodoxy as ‘sceptical’ rather 
than ‘critical’ theory on the  basis that the former, like ‘traditional’ theory, still “present[s] its analyses as 
‘news from nowhere’”, whereas the latter “takes up enquiry with a view to engaging social actors in a 
process of reflection on their circumstances” and how these affect their perspectives.  However, Hunt’s point 
remains valid insofar as Marks acknowledges that ‘critical’ theory does not itself “propos[e] blueprints or 
advanc[e] formulae of its own” for an alternative to the contemporary global order.  (See Marks (2000), 
pp144 and 137) 
6 Fine, R. “Marxism and the Social Theory of Law” in Banakar, R. and Travers, M. (eds) An Introduction of 
Law and Social Theory (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002), p102 
7 Stewart, A. “Althusser’s Structuralism and a Theory of Class” Critique Vol. 36, No. 3 (Dec 2008), p421 11 
 
foothold in international legal scholarship.  However, although it is outwith the scope of 
this thesis to give a detailed ‘defence of (Structural) Marxism’ as a theoretical tradition, it 
is important to clarify that the choice of perspective is far from arbitrary. 
 
The  strength  of  Marxism  is  that  its  conceptual  repertoire  is  both  robust  and  flexible 
enough  for  analysing  social  relationships  at  multiple  levels  and  it  also  offers  a 
complementary political strategy for implementing its insights to achieve practical change.  
By comparison, the poststructuralist focus on individuality and difference – evidenced by 
an  engagement  with  language  theory,  micro-histories,  psychology  etc.  –  is  not  easily 
imported into international legal scholarship which, at least formally, ignores individuals 
and treats only nation-states and international institutions as legal actors.
8  Furthermore, the 
rejection of Marxism’s conceptual project – driven by what François Lyotard famously 
called ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ – leaves its practical emancipatory potential 
compromised: 
 
“[T]he very ingenuousness of [poststructuralism’s] promise to respect everyone's 
individuality, offers a meagre threat to existing power hierarchies...  Revolt and 
revolution fade into formalistically defined gestures of ‘opposition,’ directed not 
against capitalism but against a ‘power’ that is at once omnipresent and evanescent 
– impossible ever to overcome”.
9 
 
As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, this is not only ineffective, but “can even 
coincide with and support the functions and practices of imperial rule”
10 by misdirecting 
progressive projects and legitimising, by leaving unquestioned, important aspects of how 
that rule operates.  The counterpoint which Marxism offers to this is the insight that: 
 
“No matter how fluid, spontaneous, and revolutionary a society is, it must create 
institutions that at some point guide and define the limits of social practice.  As a 
series of crystallised social practices within history, law becomes a condition as 
well as a form of social practice, a framework within which law-making itself takes 
place.  Law is thus always structure as well as practice”.
11 
                                                           
8 This formal statocentrism is, of course, not without its exceptions and contestations.  International 
Humanitarian Law, for example, can be said to ascribe rights to individuals, while International Criminal 
Law attributes responsibility to them.  However, according to orthodox accounts, the state is still the key 
actor in the field, either because instances of individual rights and responsibilities are highly specific to a 
particular issue or situation, or because the treaties and rules of customary law which confer individual 
rights/responsibilities (and upon which such rights/responsibilities are dependent) are made by, and bind, 
only nation-states.  For a more detailed discussion of this particular issue, see McCorquodale, R. “The 
Individual and the International Legal System” in Evans (2006), pp307-332 
9 Foley, B. “Marxism in the Poststructuralist Moment” Cultural Critique, No. 15 (Spring, 1990),  p16 
10 Hardt, M. and Negri, A. Empire (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2000), p142 
11 Spitzer, S. “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology of Law” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9 (1983), 
p109 (emphasis added) 12 
 
 
 
Locating the project 
 
The  radical  law  project  has  not  always  been  one  to  attract  support  within  Marxist 
scholarship.  This is because many Marxists believe, to use Fidel Castro’s words, that “the 
people have a deep sense of justice, above and beyond the hairsplitting of jurisprudence”
12 
which becomes at best a distraction, and at worst collaboration in a bourgeois ideological 
sham.  China Miéville goes even further to argue, uncompromisingly, that “[t]he chaotic 
and  bloody  world  around  us  is  the  rule  of  law”,
13 that  law  is  incompatible  with  “any 
systematic progressive political project”
14 and that “[i]n order fundamentally to change the 
dynamics  of the [global capitalist] system  it  [is]  necessary...  to  eradicate the forms  of 
law”
15 altogether.    Yet  Marx  himself  was  concerned  enough  about  the  legal  order  to 
engage in its critique, even if by the time of his death his account remained incomplete 
and, in parts, unclear.   
 
Such critique remains important for three reasons.  Firstly, as was remarked recently at a 
radical law conference, ‘you can ignore the law, but the law won’t ignore you’.  This, of 
course, echoes the famous warning (attributed to Pericles)
16 that ‘just because you do not 
take an interest in politics doesn't mean politics won't take an interest in you’.  This is not 
simply an argument against apathy, however, but rather a reminder that, to the extent that 
power is exerted through international law, arguing that it is ‘not really’ international law 
which affects the outcome of power-relations does nothing to lessen its effect.  Secondly, 
there has been a visible spread of legal regulation into every aspect of social and political 
life in contemporary capitalism,
17 which means that there are few, if any, areas in which 
                                                           
12 Hsiao, A, and Lim, A, (eds) The Verso Book of Dissent: From Spartacus to the Shoe-Thrower of Baghdad 
(Verso, London, 2010) p205, quoting Fidel Castro  
13 Miéville, C. “The Commodity-Form Theory of International Law: an Introduction”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law Vol. 17 (2004), p302 (emphasis in original)  As Susan Marks argues, though she does not 
share Miéville’s pessimism about the emancipatory potential of engaging with law, “[i]f [(international) law] 
has failed and goes on failing millions, this is not ‘on occasion,’ but overwhelmingly and systematically.  Put 
differently, if we live in a world of chaos and conflict, that is not in spite of international law, it is in part 
because of it.”  (Marks, S. “International Judicial Activism and the Commodity-Form Theory of International 
Law”, E.J.I.L Vol.18, no.1 (2007), p202) 
14 Miéville (2004), p301 
15 Miéville (2004), p301 (emphasis added) 
16 c. 495-429 BC 
17 This is clear from even a brief scan of the United Nations Treaty Series Cumulative Index No. 44 
(http://treaties.un.org/pages/CumulativeIndexes.aspx, accessed 24 June 2011) where a simple list of treaties 
since 1875 runs to over three hundred pages.  The chronological trajectory of increasing codification visible 
in the list must, however, be viewed in light of David Kennedy’s argument that “[i]t is a long running cliché 
that statutes have ‘proliferated’...  [however], these developments do not increase the distributive importance 13 
 
law can be dismissed as irrelevant.  Finally, as Richard Kinsey argues, “[i]t is not possible 
to conceive of the complex division of labour of a capitalist order and the totality of its 
social  relations  without  law.    Law  is  embedded,  inextricably,  in  the  organisation  and 
culture of our social existence”.
18  It defines “what shall be property and what shall be a 
crime”,
19 and  legal  ideology  plays  an  important  part  in  normalising  and  legitimising 
capitalist relations, not least through the artificial elision of ‘justice’ and ‘legality’ and 
separation  of  law  and  politics,  which  together  obscure  the  fact  that  “speaking  law  to 
politics is not the same thing as speaking truth to power”.
20  Whether or not (international) 
law contains emancipatory potential, what is important, and what justifies its critique, is its 
structural centrality in the global capitalist order. 
 
Marxian analysis in international law
21 
 
Beyond the ‘official’ Marxist line on international law promulgated from within the Soviet 
Bloc – which despite its radical shell was little more than “a tool for the exigencies of 
official policy”
22 exhibiting the same formalism  Marx originally critiqued in bourgeois 
legal scholarship – the vast majority of Marxist legal theory has been explicitly domestic in 
focus.    Within  the  last  20  years,  however,  there  has  been  a  resurgence  of  explicitly 
theoretical work focused on developing a Marxian critique of international law.  Some of 
the key figures during this period include Susan Marks, B.S. Chimni (who, although often 
writing from an explicitly Marxist perspective, is typically considered instead as being part 
of the TWAIL movement which can be critical of Marxism’s Eurocentric aspects), China 
Miéville, A. Claire Cutler and Bill Bowring (who was also involved in legal practice).  
This development is being continued and strengthened by a number of theorists including 
Rob Knox, Reccia Orzek, Umut Özsu, Paavo Kotiaho, Irina Cerić and Akbar Rasulov. 
 
The paucity of Marxist international legal scholarship is evident not only in the small 
number of theorists  writing on the subject,  but also  in  the restricted  range of Marxist 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of law, but only bring to visibility what was there all along”.  (See Kennedy, D. “The Stakes of Law, or Hale 
and Foucault!” 15 Legal Stud. F. 1991, p334) 
18 Kinsey, R. “Marxism and the Law: Preliminary Analyses” British Journal of Law and Society Vol. 5. No. 
2 (Winter, 1978), p202 (emphasis added) 
19 Thompson, E.P. Whigs and Hunters: the Origins of the Black Act (Allen Lane, London, 1975) p259 
20 Kennedy, D., The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2004), p28 
21 This section builds on a line of discussion which emerged during the Glasgow Conversations in 
International Law symposium on 19 February 2010 at Glasgow University School of Law, and on Rob 
Knox’s contribution on the ‘long rambling history’ of Marxist international legal scholarship. 
22 Miéville (2006), p60 14 
 
theoretical traditions from which these theorists draw their inspiration, compared to the 
breadth of the Marxist conceptual landscape utilised by critical domestic legal theorists.  
Much  of  the  recent  Marxist  international  legal  scholarship  has  been  centred  on  the 
important work of Evgeny Pashukanis (who explicitly deals with international law even if 
it is not his main concern).  In contrast, little mention has been made of the legal critiques 
which are present in the works of Alan Stone, Isaac Balbus, Göran Therborn, Antonio 
Gramsci, Georg Lukács, Louis Althusser or Nicos Poulantzas, for example, despite the 
important place these have within domestic Marxist legal theory.  
 
 
Structuring the project 
 
The second chapter of this thesis will seek to investigate the form of law and show how the 
accounts  of  legal  relationships  and  the  legal  order  provided  by  theorists  of  the 
contemporary left contribute to this element of the radical international law project in ways 
which the orthodox alternatives cannot.  It will engage with Miéville’s ‘commodity-form 
theory of international law’ which, drawing on amongst other things Pashukanite Marxism 
and  Newstream  analyses  of  indeterminacy,  has  become  a  valuable  focal  point  for 
contemporary critical investigations into the legal form and its immanent connection to the 
systematic violence of imperialism.  However, it will argue that Miéville’s theory is neither 
nuanced nor comprehensive enough to stand alone, and must be augmented by analysis 
from other Marxist traditions, such as those centred on the works of Gramsci, Lukács and 
Althusser. 
 
The third chapter will seek to examine the structure of the global legal order and show how 
B.S. Chimni’s proposition that we conceptualise that order as a ‘nascent (imperial) global 
state’ allows for the strategic integration of insights from domestic legal scholarship which 
alternative  accounts  do  not,  or  cannot,  incorporate.  It  will  argue  that,  in  order  to 
understand  how  this  global  state  functions,  it  is  vital  to  transcend  not  only  orthodox 
conceptions of the state, but also classical and Pashukanite Marxist conceptions.  Instead, 
the global state must be viewed as a class state of the sort analysed by Poulantzas, shaped 
by the interactions of transnational classes within a complex and multi-level institutional 
structure. 
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The fourth chapter will seek to analyse how the legal form is imbued with content and 
show  how  the  capitalist  (class)  relations  which  constitute  the  global  economy  become 
inscribed  in  the  international  legal  order  in  ways  mediated  by  that  order’s  internal 
structure.  It will argue for the rejection of instrumentalism as an explanatory framework in 
favour of an account which incorporates the concept, and is thus able to recognise the 
phenomenon, of ‘relative autonomy’ and will engage in particular with the works of Stone, 
Hillel Ticktin and David Kennedy in its exploration of how the essential relations of the 
contemporary global-capitalist order are expressed in concrete norms and legal practices. 
 
The final and concluding chapter will seek to tie together the analytical strands above into 
one coherent, if necessarily prolegomenal, whole. 
   16 
 
Chapter 2 – ‘Law’ unpacked 
 
In order to examine the accounts of International Law provided by theorists of the critical 
left it is necessary to begin by asking “what is ‘International Law’?”  and – what appears to 
be simply a reformulation but is a subtly, and crucially, different question – “what is it they 
speak of when they speak of ‘International Law’?”  Both questions fit within the more 
general field of enquiry into the nature of ‘Law’: to be able to see the difference between 
them it is necessary to distinguish International Law as the objective social phenomenon 
(denoted here by ‘international law’, all in lowercase) and as the conceptual artefact that 
purports to designate it (denoted here by ‘International Law’, capitalised).  It is the elision 
of these two meanings which explains why, as H.L.A. Hart observes, “most speculation 
about the ‘nature’ of law... has usually been conceived as a search for the definition of law 
[even though] nothing concise enough to be recognised as a definition could provide a 
satisfactory answer”.
23 
 
This distinction requires to be drawn not only for the sake of discursive clarity, but also 
because the problem with the existing orthodox accounts of international law lie in the 
distance  which  may  be  found  within  them  between  their  concepts  and  the  underlying 
objective phenomenon.  There will always be some distance of course because, like the 
physical  phenomenon  of  gravity  described  in  Pierre  Macherey’s  literary  analogy,
24 the 
social phenomenon of international  law functions  without ‘announcing  the logic of its 
functioning’, meaning that International Law is not in international law but elsewhere, in 
the  domain  of  legal  scholarship.    The  difference  between  Marxian  and  orthodox 
international legal scholarship (given that they necessarily share the same object) therefore 
exists  in  the  former’s  potential  for  reducing  the  critical  distance  between  concept  and 
phenomenon.  This potential lies in the fact that those Marxists who take (international) 
law seriously, when they speak of (International) Law, speak of, and thus explain, what 
other theorists intentionally do not or cannot, because of the limitations of their conceptual 
frameworks.  As Macherey advocates, we should question orthodox scholarship “as to 
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knowledge”.  Macherey, P. A Theory of Literary Production (Wall, trans) (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
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what it does not and cannot say, in those silences for which it has been made...  [and] in the 
very letter of the text where incoherence and incompleteness burst forth”.
25 
 
 
Orthodox scholarship’s search for the legal form 
 
In its search for the legal form, orthodox legal scholarship has produced a number of often 
quite different accounts of the nature of law.  While analysing each of these individually is 
of course beyond the scope of this thesis, it is useful, in questioning the ‘incoherence and 
incompleteness’ of orthodox scholarship as a whole, to consider a few examples.  These 
may, of course, be categorised in a variety of ways, with the most common approach 
within orthodox scholarship being to group accounts according the ‘tradition’ to which 
they belong.  This approach is, however, conventional rather than necessary and, although 
it does not map neatly onto the orthodox taxonomy, a useful way in which to group these 
examples for the present purposes is provided by Roscoe Pound, who divides them into 
three categories: law as rules, law as a regime of social control and law as a process.   
 
According to Pound, “the oldest and longest continued use of the term ‘law’ in juristic 
writing is to mean the aggregate of laws, the whole body of the legal precepts which obtain 
in a given politically organised society...  Law was an aggregate of laws and a law was an 
authoritative rule of conduct”.
26  This view is echoed in Hans Kelsen’s ‘Pure Theory’ of 
law, which argues that “[i]nternational law consists of norms that were created to regulate 
interstate relations... they impose obligations on, and grant rights to, all states”.
27  The next 
development, Pound claims, emerged when “Kant at the end of the eighteenth  century 
applied the term to the condition which the body of precepts brings about or seeks to bring 
about and so came near to the idea of the legal order”.
28  Although neither are part of the 
Kantian tradition, the work of the American Legal Realists (in particular Robert Hale and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes)
29 and the international law scholarship  which grew out of the 
Institutionalist school of International Relations (which includes the work of Anne-Marie 
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26 Pound, R., The Ideal Element in Law, (University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1958), p1 
27 Kelsen, H. Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Paulson, trans) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), 
p107 
28 Pound (1958), pp1-2 
29 See (i) Hale, R.L. “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State” Political Science 
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Slaughter and Harold Hongju Koh)
30 both look beyond rules to consider the legal order.   
The former  (which  though not internalised by international law scholarship,  is  easily 
adapted from its domestic roots) focuses on law’s role in the provision of the background 
‘rules of the game’ for social interaction, which it has “not because it orders in the sense of 
telling [states] what to do and what not to do, but because [it] is an aspect of [states’] 
calculation  of  what  they  can  get  and  get  away  with  in  their  relationships  with  other 
[states]”.
31  The latter, focuses on the more direct role of law in fostering international 
cooperation.  Finally, Pound describes what he sees as a consequence of the development 
of  functional  analyses,  the  “increased  attention  to  the  phenomena  of  the  actual 
administration of justice... what Mr. Justice Cardozo has taught us to call the ‘judicial 
process’...    As  Llewellyn  has  put  it,  ‘[w]hat  officials  do  about  disputes  is...  the  law 
itself’.”
32  Elements of this approach can be found in the work of Myres McDougal, who 
argues that international law “is not  a mere static body of rules but is rather a whole 
decision-making  process...  of  continuous  interaction...  in  which  the  decision-makers  of 
particular  nation  states  unilaterally  put  forward  claims...  and  in  which  other  decision-
makers, external to the demanding state... weigh and appraise these competing claims... 
and ultimately accept or reject them”.
33 
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Economy Approaches to International Institutions” in Bhandari, J.S. and Sykes, A.O. (eds.) Economic 
Dimensions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
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31 Kennedy (1991), p357 (emphasis in original) An example is provided by Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes 
in their analysis of the ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) rule (originally part of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now part of the Word Trade Organisation (WTO) system) which requires that 
“any concession negotiated with a single trading partner or group of trading partners must be extended 
without condition to all other trading nations”.  As Schwartz and Sykes explain, “the MFN obligation serves 
as an important part of the rules governing the conduct of multilateral trade negotiations.  Ex ante, the 
participants in the negotiations know that all concessions they give under MFN will extend to every other 
signatory government regardless of their ability to exact a quid pro quo.  They further realise that they may 
benefit from concessions extended by others without having to give a quid pro quo.  Ex post, the participants 
know that the value of any concession they obtain under MFN will not be impaired by subsequent and more 
generous concessions to other countries.  Hence, the MFN requirement is not simply a rule that constrains 
trade discrimination, but also a rule that shapes the bargaining game in the WTO/GATT system.”  (Schwartz, 
W.F. and Sykes, A.O. “The Economics of the Most Favoured Nation Clause” in Bhandari, J.S. and Sykes, 
A.O. (eds.) Economic Dimensions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), p59 and 46 (emphasis in original), respectively.) 
32 Pound (1958), pp2-3 
33 McDougal, M. “The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea” A.J.I.L. Vol. 49, No. 3 
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Viewing law as rules 
 
Although international law is a normative system to the extent that individual laws can be 
expressed as rules, to generalise from this and treat international law simply as “the sum 
total of a number of individual laws taken together”,
34 raises far more questions than it 
answers.  For example, orthodox normative accounts may be able to explain whether a 
particular set of practices amongst states in a region has become a rule of regional, or even 
general, custom (and thus international law formally so-called).  However, they cannot 
explain why some practices exist and others do not.  For those that do exist, they cannot 
explain why some are formalised as (legal) rules and others not – remaining (political) 
‘rules  of  international  comity’
35  –  without  resorting  to  the  nebulous,  circular  and 
contradictory principle of opinio iuris sive necessitatis, that “mysterious phenomenon of 
customary international law which is deemed to be a source of law only on condition that it 
is accordance with law”.
36 
 
Similarly, there is nothing inherent in the concept of pacta sunt servanda
37 which indicates 
that it ought to be regarded as a legal rule, and yet, as McDougal argues, it “is not a matter 
purely of verbal æsthetics what variables in [the] world power process are described as 
‘law’”
38 and what variables are described as ‘politics’ or ‘economics’.  The nominalist 
alternative, according to which the rules of international behaviour are “only law because 
we say they are law, rather than because of their form or essence”,
39 lacks any explanatory 
force.  It offers no answer to the question of why we call some rules law, and others not.  
The critical distance between international law and International Law is erased (as both are 
assumed  to  exist  at  the  conceptual  level)  not  by  conforming  International  Law  to 
international law, but by collapsing the latter altogether, making the former into an empty 
signifier.  Nominalism also precludes any investigation into why, if international law does 
not exist as such (because of the “radical contingency in the legal nature of international 
law”),
40 International Law has come to exist. 
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Viewing law as process 
 
McDougal proposes his ‘law as process’ alternative to what he sees as the focus of the 
normative conception of law “upon doctrine to the exclusion of the pattern of practices by 
which it is given meaning and made effective”.
41  In essence, McDougal argues for an 
account of law which takes into account not simply the formal authority to make decisions 
laid down by the rules of international law, but the actual procedures and policies followed 
and implemented in effective decision-making.
42  This provides the additional conceptual 
space necessary for  the consideration  of how individual international laws are made, 
interpreted  and  applied  in  customary  practice,  treaty -negotiation  or  judicial/arbitral 
decision-making, as well as an account of what happens when, as in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case,
43 international laws appear either to be in conflict or to ‘run out’.  Here, 
Norway made claims that certain areas of sea fell within its territorial waters, claims which 
“could not be justified by reference either to explicit agreement or widely accepted custom, 
and which has been protested by other nation states, but by drawing upon all relevant 
sources of policy and a great variety of considerations in the context, the [International 
Court of Justice] concluded that Norway’s claims were lawful”.
44 
 
McDougal’s alternative, however, is also problematic: by viewing international law as a 
process only action is rendered, or recognised as, constitutive.  The failure or refusal to 
participate (by not becoming a party to a treaty, tendering an appearance in an arbitral or 
judicial forum, populating yearbooks with legal opinions or enforcing a decision), is not 
captured by this concept of Law and thus the resultant effect of inaction on the practice of 
law remains untheorised.
45  As Michael Byres argues, “[t]he ability of powerful States to 
participate more effectively in the customary process [through having larger diplomatic 
corps able to follow international developments and promptly object to those contrary to 
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participants and their perspectives, including the demands they make on each other, the interactions in which 
they influence each other, the bases of their power, the practices they engage in, and the effects that they 
get.”  Law, in this account, “when understood with all its commitments and procedures... offers... a 
continuous formulation and reformulation of policies”.  (Ibid, pp107 and 111 (emphasis added)) 
43 U.K. v Norway I.C.J. Reports 1951, p116 
44 McDougal (1955), p359  footnote 10 
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their  interests  as  well  as  greater  military,  economic  and  political  strength  to  enforce 
jurisdictional  claims, impose trade sanctions  and divert  international  criticism] may be 
partly concealed by the fact that States sometimes choose not to participate in that process 
in respect of particular rules...  [furthermore], a powerful State’s decision not to participate 
actively in respect of a particular rule may in some situations also constitute an application 
of power having effects of its own”
 46 insofar as it could have participated and changed the 
outcome. 
 
Viewing law as social control 
 
The final orthodox view is that which views international law as a regime of social control.  
Many accounts which use this conception view it as a regime of cooperation influencing 
individual and communal decision-making,
47 and even those, such as  the Realists, who 
view the (international) legal order as essentially coercive, do not base their arguments (as 
rule-theories might) on the actuality and ever-present threat sanctions.  Indeed, it is often 
pointed out by those Miéville calls ‘international law deniers’ (both those who deny that 
international  law  is  law  and  those  who  ‘just’  deny  that  it  is  a  determining  force  in 
international relations)
48 that the lack of a formal, supra-national and centralised sovereign 
entity, a Hobbesean Leviathan capable of unilaterally enforcing international law, means 
that international legal sanctions are often uncertain and visibly determined by political and 
economic concerns, even to orthodox textbook authors: 
 
“The  USSR  and  the  US  were  not  arraigned  for  intervening  unlawfully  in 
Afghanistan  in  1979  and  Grenada  in  1983  respectively  and  Israel,  though 
condemned by the UN, has never been brought to book for its annexation of Middle 
East territory...  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which affected Western oil interests, 
was  rapidly  dealt  with,  but  there  was  no  such  physical  retaliation  against 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor”.
49 
 
Discussing law in terms of the legal order does not restrict inquiry to formal legal rules but 
instead recognises that international law is a total system which exists and affects social 
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interaction  even  where  particular  rules  are  silent.    In  other  words,  it  recognises  that 
“[l]iving  outside  the  law  is  an  impossibility”.
50   This  may  be  obvious  with  regard  to 
domestic law but it applies equally to international law even if, in the daily lives of most 
people, its existence and effects appear both latent and distant in comparison.  Secondly, 
this  view  allows  the  concept  of  International  Law  to  capture,  and  thus  explain,  the 
situations of apparent inaction on the part of legal actors: it recognises that “the legal order 
permits  as  well  as  prohibits,  in  the  simple-minded  sense  that  it  could  prohibit,  but 
[international judges and treaty-negotiators] reject demands from those injured that the 
injurers be restrained”.
51  Indeed, the permission of the international legal order may even 
be hidden within formal but unenforced prohibition: “a covert legal permission, which 
would often be highly controversial if formalised”.
52 
 
As Wesley Hohfeld argues, even in interactions where international law is silent, it is still 
responsible for the outcome insofar as it ‘could have made it otherwise’, and it is only 
because “we don’t think of ground rules of permission as ground rules at all, by contrast 
with ground rules of prohibition”
53 that the full ‘distributional consequences’ of law for 
social interaction largely remain unrecognised.  This conception has much to offer the 
radical international law project in its displacement of the more simplistic alternatives but, 
however insightful, its usefulness in the current context is limited by the fact that what it 
                                                           
50 Kinsey (1978), p204 
51 Kennedy (1991), p333 (emphasis in original).  By definition, this is an aspect of the international legal 
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illuminates is international law’s function, rather than its nature: it is in essence a group of 
claims about what law does (regulates social interaction), not what it is. 
 
Viewing law as ‘all things to all men’ 
 
While orthodox scholars “inquire, often in a sustained, sophisticated, and quite critical 
manner, into the consequences, meanings, value, and formal definitions of artefacts like 
‘rights,’ ‘principles,’ or ‘rules,’ they virtually never question the ontological identity or 
status of such legal artefacts”.
54  This is why orthodox accounts, even where they provide 
nuanced descriptions of international law, are unable to provide a convincing explanation 
of it; we have an account of the how without the what.  To move beyond description, a 
theory of  international law needs not only to provide conceptual space for its distinct 
existence within the wider structure of modern social relations, but must also account for 
this existence, for what is specific about it.  For if there is no significant difference then it 
makes little sense to talk of and analyse international law as a distinct phenomenon at all; if 
there  is,  then  identifying  and  analysing  this  difference  will  help  provide  a  useful  and 
coherent account of what international law is, even if the distinctiveness that will be thus 
reached at the level of concepts would not easily translate into a clear empirical separation 
of international law from the other major parts of that structure. 
 
The definitions analysed above have all adhered in orthodox scholarship because, despite 
their problems, they each capture an aspect of how international law operates and what it 
appears to be.  One of the core problems with the orthodox approach, however, lies in its 
attempted solution to the individual issues with these definitions: “taking all three of these 
meanings as included in the one term [International Law] ...and then assuming that the 
whole  may  be  defined”
55  results  in  no  factor  being  ultimately  determinative  and 
distinguishing, and thus any account produced being either vague and shapeless or self-
contradictory.  International law becomes at once an activity (or activities) in which legal 
professionals and legal subjects engage, a subject which exercises control by forbidding or 
permitting actions, and as an object (or a collection of them) which may be made, enforced 
or violated.  Pierre Schlag offers a cutting critique of this in his analysis of what he calls 
the ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ æsthetics. 
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In the former, law and “legal entities (principles, policies, rules, and so on) are perceived, 
apprehended, and expressed in the same manner as aspects of physical reality”.
56  This is 
so common, indeed, that the underlying assumptions go largely unremarked despite being 
‘downright bizarre’: 
 
“[I]t is one thing to affirm that rocks, hammers or car engines partake in the object-
form – that they are substantial, bounded, divisible (and so on).  It seems to be quite 
another  to  affirm  the  same  thing  about  race  discrimination  law,  personal 
jurisdiction, or involuntary manslaughter.”
57 
 
In the latter, “Law ‘requires’, it ‘demands’, it ‘obligates’, it ‘compels’.  Law and the legal 
entities are cast as the effective source of legal action.  And they become personified – 
endowed with the characteristics reserved for subjects: will, intention, purpose, and even 
personality.”
58   This  anthropomorphisation,  or  even  deification,  of  the  law  (‘magical 
thinking’ as Schlag calls it) is, of course, equally bizarre.  Although it may be possible to 
argue that such oddities, ambiguities and contradictions are not errors of analysis but a 
feature  of  the  presence-action  of  international  law  in  the  multitude  complexities  and 
contradictions  of  global  society,  this  elides  methodological  eclecticism  and  empirical 
complexity, resulting in an unintentional quasi-Hegelian International Law as the ‘sewer 
into which all contradictions flow’. 
 
 
Finding form through Marxian scholarship 
 
What Marxian scholarship offers by way of improvement upon the problems with orthodox 
scholarship analysed above, given that both are orientated towards the same phenomenon, 
international law, is a qualitatively different concept of International Law derived from the 
fact that Marxists approach things differently: they ask a different kind of question and 
focus on a different set of problems.  
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Reprieve and crossover: viewing law as (hegemonic) social control 
 
Because of the insights it provides, the orthodox view of law as a regime of social control 
is one which has found traction also within Marxian legal scholarship.  Unfortunately, this 
has also sometimes meant the importation of its problematic tendencies, with some Marxist 
accounts resorting to a crude reductionism wherein the legal order is treated as a simple 
and conscious system of brute repression by capitalists, exercised primarily through nation-
state institutions.
59  This clearly offers no meaningful  contribution to an analysis of the 
international legal order: it relies on the exercise of police power which has no direct 
analogy in international relations, it provides no reason why repression occurs through law, 
rather than remaining openly political or economic in nature, and it ignores the fact that 
international law does not typically operate through the kind of direct oppression which 
such an account would suggest.  As Knox argues, “those whose needs go unfulfilled are 
much greater in number and, by consequence, possess a much greater potential capacity for 
violence  than  those  who  ‘own’.    If  violence  were  the  only,  or  primary,  guarantee  of 
commodity  exchange  [and  the  legal  order  built  upon  it],  then  it  would  have  been 
overthrown long ago”.
60 
 
To understand the other, crucial, ‘guarantee’ it is necessary to turn to the explanatory force 
of the concept of Ideology.  However, in order to do so effectively, it is necessary first to 
clarify what phenomenon is being designated by it.  Marks, in her book The Riddle of All 
Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology,
61 outlines a 
number of different ideas of what Ideology is meant to describe, most of which would not 
positively contribute to the radical international law project.  Where, for example, ideology 
is seen as existing simply in (mistaken) ideas it makes sense to argue, as Miéville does, that 
the  ideological  function  of  international  law  is  not  “all,  or  even  primarily  or  most 
interestingly what there is to it [because] actually-existing law is manifestly not ‘merely’ 
ideological [in this sense], but impinges on and regulates everyday life at all levels”.
62  
Indeed, as Marks herself argues, “the problem with ideology is not that it involves error, 
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but that it sustains privilege.  To be sure, mystification is in play, but the ideas nurtured are 
not simple mistakes or inaccuracies; they are as much a part of the prevailing reality as is 
the privilege they serve to sustain.”
63  This dual insight, that ideology is more than the 
‘velvet glove’ of lies and propaganda hiding the ‘iron fist’ of capitalist repression, finds its 
most radical formulation in the work of Althusser, who also provides the explanation for 
the (re)production of ideology: 
 
“[A]n  ideology  always  exists  in...  its  practice.    This  existence  is  material.    Of 
course, the material existence of the ideology... does not have the same modality as 
the  material  existence  of  a  paving-stone  or  a  rifle.    But...  we  are  indebted  to 
Pascal’s defensive ‘dialectic’ for the wonderful formula which will enable us to 
invert the order to the notional schema of ideology [that ‘men tend to do what they 
think they are doing’].  Pascal says more or less: ‘Kneel down, move your lips in 
prayer, and you will believe.’ ...Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are 
endowed  with  an  ideal  or  spiritual  existence),  to  the  precise  extent  that  it  has 
emerged that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed by 
rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus.”
64 
 
The  ideology  of  international  law  is  the  result  of  totality  of  the  material  practices  of 
international legal actors and international legal professionals of all types, and any critique 
must take these material practices, and not simply the ideas secreted by them, seriously. 
 
It is possible to construct a more nuanced version of the Marxian account of international 
law as a regime of social control, which does exactly this, using the insights provided by 
Gramsci’s  concept  of  Hegemony,  which  “makes  it  possible  to  grasp  the  connection 
between the ways in which social consciousnesses are formed and the exercise of political 
(or class) rule under conditions of high levels of popular consent”
65 and in the absence of 
generalized  repression.    Hegemony,  for  Gramsci,  designates  the  ‘ideological 
subordination’ of the working class through processes in which “[t]he world view of the 
ruling class...  [is] so thoroughly diffused... as to become the common sense of the whole 
of society”,
66 at least in part by incorporating “some aspects of the aspirations, interests, 
and  ideology  of  subordinate  groups”.
67   This  incorporation  is  not  only  the  result  of 
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conscious  concession  but  also  the  result  of  class  struggles:  as  Macherey  argues,  “a 
historical period does not spontaneously produce a single, monolithic ideology but a series 
of ideologies determined by the total relation of forces; each ideology is shaped by the 
pressures upon the class which generates it”.
68 
 
The  introduction  of  the  concept  of  ‘consent’  into  an  account  of  law  as  coercion  is, 
however, not without its problems: as Hunt argues, “[t]he more Marxism has succeeded in 
overcoming... its tendency towards an instrumental reduction of law to the state and the 
state  in  its  turn  to  organised  violence,  the  more  it  has,  paradoxically,  manifested  the 
dualism coercion/consent which characterises ‘bourgeois’ legal thought”.
69  This can be 
seen in  the ‘rupture’ between Marxian approaches  to  domestic law that  focus  on “the 
regulation of the social relations of production”
70 through property and contract law, and 
on  “the  role  of  law  in  the  preservation  of  class  domination”
71 through  criminal  and 
constitutional  law,  which,  if  unsophisticatedly  reintegrated,  can  lead  to  “an  unstable 
analysis which lurches between the polarities set up...  [while] the elements themselves 
remain discrete and... are not seen in the combinatory effect”.
72  Hunt’s argument that the 
consent-coercion (or, in Marxist terms, ideology-repression) binary does not exhaust what 
may usefully be said about (international) law finds support in the writings of Poulantzas 
                                                                                                                                                                                
‘system’, as integrated or coherent.  Third, ideological struggle is viewed, not as titanic struggles between 
rival Weltanshauungen, but as practical engagements about shifts and modifications in ‘common sense’, or 
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who criticises the idea that law “functions through repression and ideological inculcation, 
and nothing else...  [and that its power lies] in what it forbids, rules out, and prevents; or in 
its capacity to deceive, lie, obscure, hide and lead people to believe what is false.”
73 
 
Hunt outlines the danger in this dichotomous theorising that the problematic nature of 
consent becomes obscured through being contrasted with the obvious evil of coercion, 
while Poulantzas adds that it also leads to a conception of the state which acts only through 
‘terror or trickery’, thus ignoring the relation of the masses to power which forces the state 
to act “within an unstable equilibrium of compromises between the dominant classes and 
the dominated”.
74  For Hunt dichotomy finds its ‘most general expression’ in the work of 
Gramsci but this is based on a simplistic reading of the Gramscian account.  Gramsci, far 
from  not  recognising consent as  problematic, built  a theory  which is  a  critique  of the 
‘consent’  produced  by  the  bourgeoisie  and  internalised  and  thus  reproduced  by  the 
proletariat.  As such, it provides a solution to Hunt’s problematic.  Importantly, “Gramsci’s 
focus is upon the securing of ‘leadership’ and ‘direction’ by the dominant bloc rather than 
upon the more passive idea of consent itself”.
75  
 
Viewing law as relationship 
 
However  insightful,  Gramsci’s  account  of  Hegemony,  like  its  orthodox  equivalents,  is 
more  useful  for  explaining  what  international  law  does,  not  what  it  is.    For  an 
understanding of the legal form necessary for a radical International Law, we must turn to 
the work of Pashukanis.  As summarised neatly by Miéville: 
 
“Pashukanis argues that the logic of the commodity form is the logic of the legal 
form... in commodity exchange, each commodity must be the private property of its 
owner, freely given in return for the other.  In their fundamental form commodities 
exchange  at  a  rate  determined  by  their  exchange  value,  not  because  of  some 
external reason or because one party to the exchange demands it.  Therefore, each 
agent in the exchange must be i) an owner of private property, and ii) formally 
equal to the other agent(s)...  The legal form is the necessary form taken by the 
relation between these formally equal owners of exchange values.”
76 
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The key elements of Pashukanis’ contribution will be dealt with below:  the identification 
of international law as a relationship, the question raised of the homology of the legal form 
and  the  commodity  form  and  the  provision  of  a  possible  solution  to  the  apparent 
contingency of law’s ‘law-ness’ in the alternative accounts discussed above. 
 
Relations of exchange and production 
 
Viewing law  as  a relationship  turns the most pervasive orthodox account  on its  head: 
focusing on rules “posits an international law that is outside [social] relationship[s] and 
applies to [them].  For Pashukanis on the other hand, out of the relationship comes the 
law”.
77  Of course, in itself, this is not particularly radical: even the orthodox law as regime 
theorists  recognised that  “the law of possession could  not  possibly have been evolved 
before a system of possession was in existence [and p]rovisions of law with reference to 
contract  could  not  possibly  have  come  before  the  corresponding  agreements  had  been 
made”.
78   The  orthodox  accounts,  however,  simply  posit  what  are  in  essence  distinct, 
proto-legal, precursors of the contemporary legal regimes and relations they analyse, rather 
than  making  the  radical  analytical  move  of  linking  the  relationships  underlying  legal 
norms to the totality of capitalist social (class) relations.  Furthermore, too great a focus on 
a social order risks uncritically privileging structures over agency and thus limiting the 
scope  of  investigation  into  the  individuals  and  classes  whose  interactions  are  being 
ordered. 
 
Pashukanis, focusing on the commodity-form, finds the explanation of international law’s 
form in the capitalist exchange relation and Miéville builds on this an account of the 
international legal order which locates the violence of international imperialism in that 
same relation.  However, such ‘violence’ (here referring more to capitalist relations of 
domination than mere physical force, though the former of course involves the latter) “is 
the violence of the market, of the commodity, and of the legal form, but it is not class 
violence.  The necessity of coercion inheres in the exchange of commodities, not on a 
particular mode of production and exploitation”.
79  Yet class is at the heart of the Marxist 
theory, not least because, as Chris Arthur argues, “it is precisely one of the interesting 
features of bourgeois exploitation that it inheres in economic relations that do not achieve 
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formal legal expression...  The monopolisation of the means of production by the capitalist 
class is an extra-legal fact (quite unlike the political-economic domination of the feudal 
lord)”.
80  Indeed, Marx himself argued that “[t]he way in which men produce their means 
of subsistence... must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical 
existence of the individuals.  Rather it is... a definite mode of life on their part...  What they 
are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how 
they produce”
81 rather than how they exchange the products of that production.  
 
There is clearly tension here insofar as “Marx derived law from relations of commodity 
production,  [whereas]  Pashukanis  derived  it  from  commodity  exchange”,
82 and  some 
theorists,  including  Robert  Fine  and  more  recently  Bill  Bowring,  argue  that  the 
commodity-form  theory  is  therefore  ‘plainly  wrong’,  at  least  by  Marxian  standards.  
Miéville’s  counterargument  –  that  under  capitalism,  “[n]ot  only  is  all  production  for 
exchange, but the producers only avail themselves of production by exchange: that is the 
nature of wage-labour... the wage-labourer sells her labour-power to the capitalist for its 
value, in an act of exchange without which capital would be paralysed”
83 – is interesting 
but insufficient.  Although capitalist production cannot take place without the exchange 
inherent in the employment contract, it is production which has ontological (and should 
have epistemological) primacy.  As Macherey explains: 
 
“[T]he [commodity] does not produce its [consumers] by some mysterious power; 
the conditions that determine the production of the [commodity] also determine the 
forms  of  its  [consumption].    These  two  modifications  are  simultaneous  and 
reciprocal... the guiding principle for which is to be found in Marx’s statement ‘Not 
only the object of consumption but also the mode of consumption is produced, not 
only in an objective way but also subjectively’.”
84 
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This, of course, complements Richard Kinsey’s argument: 
 
“Precisely because the relations between private labours becomes in practice the 
abstraction ‘abstract labour’ it can be posed theoretically as such.  Nonetheless it is 
a  lived  relation.    Equally,  the  juridical  relation  between  men  in  alienation  as 
abstract  wills  can  be  posed  theoretically  as  such,  precisely  because  it  is  a 
determinate  relation  of  commodity  exchange...    As  such,  for  Marx...  such  an 
abstraction  can  never  be  treated  as  an  abstract  universal  separable  from  the 
production process, that is, its history”.
85 
 
The  logic  of  commodity  exchange  Miéville  outlines  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  to 
explain (international) law: the legal form may be related directly to the movement of the 
(global) economy in general precisely because it is abstract and general, but legal content 
cannot share that relation because, like a given social formation (be it national, regional or 
global), it is instead concrete and particular.  The imperialist nature of international law is 
thus  not  simply  in  the  immanent  but  abstract  conflict  of  the  legal  form,  but  also  the 
imported,  concrete,  repression  of  economic  exploitation  inherent  in  transnational 
productive  relations  at  a  particular  point  in  the  historical  development  of  global 
capitalism.
86 
 
Relating base and superstructure 
 
Discussion of the relative importance of relations of production and exchange brings us to 
the famous Marxian ‘base-superstructure metaphor’  –  that spatial  representation  of the 
economy as the ‘base’ of capitalist society and law as part of the ‘superstructure’ which 
rests upon it.  Some, including Poulantzas, argue that the metaphor is misleading because it 
suggests “the possibility and legitimacy of a general theory of the economy taken as an 
epistemologically  distinct  object”,
87  and  thus  leads  to  two  opposite,  but  linked, 
misconceptions.  The first, vulgar economism, holds that “any specific examination of the 
superstructural fields as objects in their own right is quite simply inadmissible, since the 
general  theory  of  the  economy  provides  the  keys  to  explaining  the  superstructures  as 
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mechanical reflections of the economic base”.
88  The second, associated with politicism, 
holds that “this general theory [of the economy] has to be duplicated by analogy in a 
general theory of every superstructural field”,
89 such as the international law.  Both are, of 
course, reductionist and, to the extent that the metaphor does imply such, Poulantzas is 
right to reject it – particularly because, as Piers Beirne reminds us, “Marx's own work 
never  posited  an  a  priori  causal  structure...    [but  rather]  a  relational  form  of  analysis 
whereby particular social relationships between classes are to be understood within the 
contexts  of  empirical  and  historical  exigencies”.
90   A  far  more  useful  reading  of  the 
metaphor is the, perhaps somewhat unorthodox, one provided by Raymond Williams in his 
New Left Review article from 1973: 
 
“We have to revalue ‘superstructure’ towards a related range of cultural practices, 
and away from a reflected, reproduced or specifically dependent  content.  And, 
crucially, we have to revalue ‘the base’ away from the notion of a fixed economic 
or technological abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in real social 
and economic relationships, containing fundamental contradictions and variations 
and therefore always in a state of dynamic process.”
91 
 
This not only complements Anthony Chase’s argument, accepted by Miéville, that “[i]t is 
the economy as a source of change... rather than as an unmediated cause... that should draw 
our  attention”,
92 but  also  accords  the  robust  materialism  of  Holloway  and  Picciotto’s 
argument that: 
 
“...the economic and the political are both forms of social relations, forms assumed 
by the basic relation of class conflict in capitalist society, the capital relation; forms 
whose separate existence springs, both logically and historically, from the nature of 
that  relation.    The  development  of  the  political  sphere  is  not  to  be  seen  as  a 
reflection of the economic, but is to be understood in terms of the development of 
the capital relation, i.e. of class exploitation in capitalist production.”
93 
 
It is a failure to recognise this nuance which has meant that so “many writers within the 
Marxian tradition have sought to construct a coherent theory of law’s place within the 
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capitalist system”
94 without success, because the alternative to seeing legal and economic 
analyses as two “ways of approaching a larger whole rather than disciplines focusing on 
natural  divisions  in  social  life  that  are  capable  of  being  understood  as  self-contained 
systems”
95  is  to  internalise  the  orthodox  disciplinarity  which  overdetermines  any 
conclusion  by  presuming  the  separation  it  purports  to  analyse.    Indeed,  as  Poulantzas 
highlights, whatever the causal relationship: 
 
“[The capitalist social totality] does not arise out of the combination of various 
instances,  all  of  which  possess  an  inalterable  structure  before  they  come  into 
relation with one another.  It is rather the mode of production itself – that totality of 
economic, political and ideological determinations – which fixes the boundaries of 
these spaces, sketching out their fields and defining their respective elements.  They 
are from the very beginning constituted by their mutual relation and articulation”.
96  
 
If the spatial metaphor is to be kept, therefore, it needs to reflect the fluid and sometimes 
messy  actually-existing  interpenetration  of  the  levels  rather  than  the  neat  and  static 
idealised relation.  Stone argues, that “[t]he legal system is... another arena for pursuing 
economic conflict, but it is not the same as the economic system.  Its central actor is not the 
economic man/woman of the marketplace, but the judicial one”.
97  Although to an extent 
this is true, the mutuality of the legal and economic spheres lies in the fact that both of the 
abstract  ‘personalities’  Stone  identifies  inhere  immediately  in  the  same  concrete 
individuals:  homo  juridicus  and  homo  economicus  are  epistemologically  but  not 
ontologically distinct.  This is an important point, for however nuanced the analysis, and 
however ‘dynamic’ and ‘mutually interrelated’ the base and superstructure are taken to be, 
the spatial metaphor still has at its core an assumption that the levels are ontologically 
distinguishable, an assumption which is called into question by Rasulov: 
 
“What exists in empirical reality, from the Marxist point of view, is only one single 
undifferentiated  totality  of  the  social  intercourse...    Unlike  liberal-bourgeois 
thought,  the  Marxist  tradition  does  not,  thus,  treat  the  ideas  of  ‘economy’, 
‘politics’,  ‘law’,  ‘art’,  etc.,  as  though  they  were  somehow  reflective  of  some 
objectively verifiable essences.  The only objectively verifiable essences that can be 
said to exist from the Marxist-theoretical point of view are... ‘total social facts,’... 
‘Economy’, ‘politics’, ‘law’ – all these terms, from the classical Marxist point of 
view, ultimately represent nothing more than just so many historically convenient 
labels  of  description,  symbols  that  in  the  end  say  far  less  about  the  inherent 
objective characteristics of those phenomena which they purport to describe than 
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about the various historically determined analytical focuses which the describers in 
question have brought to their studies of those phenomena.”
98 
 
At this point it is useful to deal with the natural question which arises; why, if law is a 
relationship, an aspect of the ‘undifferentiated totality of the social intercourse’, does it 
appear  as  a  distinct  thing,  whether  that  thing  is  a  system  of  rules,  a  social  order  or 
something else?  Although Pashukanis’ theory solves a number of problems, he leaves this 
aspect undertheorised and for an answer we must turn to Lukács and his account of the 
process of reification.
99 
 
Reification 
 
Lukács  talks  of  reification  primarily  in  the  context  in  which  Marx  first  describes  the 
process – the economic relations in capitalism between buyer and seller of commodities in 
the  marketplace.    However,  “the  problem  of  commodities  must  not  be  considered  in 
isolation  or  even  regarded  as  the  central  problem  in  economics,  but  as  the  central, 
structural  problem  of  capitalist  society  in  all  its  aspects”,
100 including  its  legal  aspect, 
because in law, as in economics, “a relation between people takes on the character of a 
thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom-objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational 
and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between 
people”.
101 
 
Both production and exchange are relations between people: in the case of production it is 
a  relationship  between  the  ‘owners’  of  the  elements  of  the  means  of  production  (raw 
materials, machinery/technology and, importantly, human skill/strength) and in the case of 
exchange it is a relationship between the ‘owners’ of the products of productive processes 
(physical  products  themselves, or the exchange-value in  money of products  previously 
produced and exchanged).  The products of productive processes “assume the form of 
commodities inasmuch as they are exchangeables, i.e. expressions of one and the same 
[measure of value]”.
102  At the same time: 
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“Through the subordination of man to the machine the situation arises in which 
men are effaced by their labour in which the pendulum of the clock has become as 
accurate a measure of the relative activity of two workers as it is of the speed of 
two  locomotives.    Therefore,  we  should  not  say  that  one  man’s  hour  is  worth 
another man’s hour, but rather than one man during an hour is worth just as much 
as another man during an hour.  Time is everything, man is nothing; he is at most 
the incarnation of time.”
103 
 
However, this “formal equality of human labour in the abstract is not only the common 
factor to which the various commodities are reduced; it also becomes the real principle 
governing the actual production of commodities”
104 insofar as the worker’s “own labour 
becomes something objective and independent of him, something that  controls him by 
virtue  of  an  autonomy  alien  to  man”
105 while  at  the  same  time  being  a  commodity 
belonging to him.  Reification makes these social interactions of production and exchange 
appear  as  objective  features  (inhering  in  exchange-value)  of  the  commodities,  and  so 
makes their exchange appear as a relation between the commodities themselves, rather 
than their owners: the interactions of relationships become the relations between things.  
This is an ideological process in both senses described above.  Although it has been said 
that  “all  reification  is  a  forgetting”,
106 not  only  does  the  social  relation  of  production 
appear as a relation between things, but “[o]bjectively a world of objects and relations 
between things springs into being...  [and t]he laws governing these objects... confront [us] 
as invisible forces that generate their own power”.
107 
 
For legal relations, reification makes the social interactions of legal subjects (inhering in 
negotiation  of  contract/treaties,  legislation,  adjudication,  enforcement  etc.)  appear  as 
objective features  of the concrete outcomes of these relations, and so makes  the legal 
system appear as a relation between the laws themselves, rather than the legal subjects.  
Legal rules are simply reified legal relationships, frozen in time,
108 which take on the form 
of things capable of affecting other relationships from a position of externality rather than, 
as  they  are,  constituent  parts  of  those  relations.
109   Even  more  fundamentally,  legal 
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a thesis of this length and because the conception of law as rules is the most common in orthodox legal 36 
 
relations between abstract legal subjects, such as states, are themselves the products of the 
reification of the social relations surrounding the production and exchange of concrete 
objects by concrete individuals. 
 
This is why the accounts of Marxist international law scholars who have not broken free of 
the orthodox conceptualisation of law as rules, are still valuable.  They give an account of 
the reified objectivity that is the content of law (though they mistake this for its nature) 
while Pashukanis pierces the reification to give an account of its form.  Although focusing 
on content “provides an explanation of the fact that legal norms conform to the material 
needs of particular social classes”,
110 “to proceed beyond a nebulous left functionalism, the 
content  of  law  must  be  considered  the  content  of  a  particular  form”.
111   Pashukanis, 
however, does not provide us with a theory of how form and content are related, and this is 
a point to which it will be important to return, for this is what is needed to formulate a 
systematic, coherent and radical analysis of the international legal order. 
 
Keeping  with  the  issue  of  reification,  although  Pashukanis  does  not  call  it  such,  he 
recognises a second and even more fundamental reification than the one outlined above.  
This double reification goes to the heart of why law is not contingent, and takes place in 
that same moment of exchange in which the commodity form and the legal form are born, 
together: 
 
“[A]t a particular stage of development, the social relations of production assume a 
mysterious  form.    On  the  one  hand  they  appear  as  relations  between  things 
(commodities),  and  on  the  other,  as  relations  between  the  wills  of  autonomous 
entities equal to each other – of legal subjects.  In addition to the mystical quality of 
value, there appears a no less enigmatic phenomenon: law.”
112 
 
Law  is  thus  not  something  external,  accidental  and  contingent,  but  an  integral  and 
necessary part of the relationship of commodity exchange.  It is the lack of a theorisation 
of the necessity of international law for global capitalism – or rather the necessity that a 
certain relationship arises and has the features which we describe as legal (formal equality, 
objectivity, etc.) – which is the recurring weakness of the other conceptions of law, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
scholarship.  However, in order to continue the process of the de-reification of (international) law, this must 
be augmented by attempts to de-reify legal processes which, like rules, do not exist in the abstract as 
autonomous things, but instead continuously (re)produced by relationships between individuals and classes. 
110 Pashukanis, E. Law and Marxism: A General Theory (InkLinks, London, 1978), p55 quoted in Miéville, 
(2006), p118 
111 Miéville, (2006), p118 
112 Pashukanis (1978), p117 quoted in Miéville, (2006), p90 37 
 
which Pashukanis manages to avoid.  At the heart of his account of the necessity of law is 
the realisation that the legal relationship is always a relationship of conflict, whether or not 
it  is  manifested  in  coercion  or  consent,  whether  explicit  or  implied  as  a  background 
condition: 
 
“Where there is even the potentiality of disputation between the sovereign, formally 
equal  individuals  implied  by  commodity  exchange...  a  specific  form  of  social 
regulation is necessary.  It must formalise the method of settlement of any such 
dispute without diminishing either party’s sovereignty or equality.  That form is 
law, which is characterised by its abstract quality, its being based on the equality of 
its subjects and its pervasive character in capitalism”.
113 
 
For  Miéville,  this  element  of  Pashukanis’  work  –  the  focus  on  dispute  between  legal 
subjects – is vital for understanding the legal form because “without dispute there would be 
no need of [legal] regulation”.
114  As Chris Arthur argues: 
 
“In technical regulation unity of purpose can be assumed, but a controversy is a 
basic element in everything juridic… law arises in order to cope with competing 
interests… the cell-form of law is the legal person asserting a claim”.
115 
 
Relational multiplicity: unpacking ‘Legality’ 
 
Looking, as Pashukanis does, at the legal relations behind rules, processes, etc. not only 
avoids reification, but it also negates the orthodox fetish for enforcing a rigid theoretical 
distinction  between  legality  and  illegality:  a  rule  may  be  followed  or  broken  and  a 
relationship  may  change,  but  with  relationships  this  change  is  an  analogue  fluctuation 
rather than a digital rupture.  This is not restricted to rule theories for whether international 
law is viewed as rules, processes or regime, violations of those rules, subversions of those 
processes and exceptions to that regime tend to be viewed as situations or moments to be 
                                                           
113 Miéville (2006), pp78-79 (emphasis in original) 
114 Ibid, pp86-87 
115 Arthur, C.J. "Towards a Materialist Theory of Law", Critique Vol. 7, No. 1 (1977), p35 (emphasis in 
original).  This distinction between legal and technical regulation, drawn from Pashukanis’ own work, is 
useful in the present context because it highlights the intimate relationship between law and the moment of 
dispute.  However, it is far from unproblematic.  Not only is the use to which Pashukanis puts it – framing 
the limits of the (dis)continuities of regulation in capitalism and socialism – utopian and uncritical, but also 
what is described as purely technical regulation may in fact be highly controversial.  For example the laying 
down of an international regulation specifying the gauge of railway tracks on cross-border routes may appear 
to be the result of a ‘unity of purpose’ in the harmonisation of standards to reduce barriers to the free 
movement of goods and passengers.  However, this ‘harmonisation’ may in fact be the codification in law of 
a victory for one party in a clash between two rival standards, or more accurately, between two factions of 
the industrial capitalist class each seeking to universalise the standard it employs in the production of railway 
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explained  away  rather  than  integral  parts  of  the  legal  system  which  involves,  and  is 
constituted by, “disputes moderated by coercion”.
116 
 
For example, some claim  “that ‘[i]t is  unsound to  study any legal  system  in  terms  of 
sanctions.  It is better to study law as a body of rules which are usually obeyed, not to 
concentrate exclusively on what happens when the rules are broken.  We must not confuse 
the pathology of law with law itself’.”
117  This is a common refrain, and even Lukács, 
though he argues for Marxists to treat the (il)legality of a proposed action as a minor point 
amongst other considerations, still tacitly accepts that law consists of norms which permit 
or prohibit and which may thus be broken or abided by.
118  The negation of this fetish is, 
however, vital.  As in the coercion-consent dichotomy discussed above, treating illegality 
as pathological, as the  illegitimate exercise of power (by the state, between classes  or 
amongst individuals) ‘outside’ the law, emphasising its ‘otherness’, obscures and in doing 
so legitimises the fact that (class) power is exercised in multifarious ways ‘inside’ the 
normal  functioning  of  international  law.  Power  “remains  operative  even  in  the  most 
routine of legal acts”
119 and law’s normal functioning includes rather than is disturbed by 
formally illegal acts. 
 
                                                           
116 Miéville (2006), p135.  Perhaps the clearest example of this is provided by Miéville a few pages later at 
pp147-148: “[W]hile a war represents a situation of widespread law-breaking... it is also one of law-
assertion.  The spirals of reprisal and counter reprisal which tend to characterise law are very often described 
and justified precisely in legalistic, ‘self-help’ terms.  In other words, in response to a perceived infringement 
of sovereignty... a state will exercise its coercive interpretation, waging war as a way of establishing its 
legalistic claim to have had its abstract rights violated.  This sets in motion counter-claims, also regulated by 
force.  In that sense, then, almost definitionally a modern war is simultaneously a fundamental violation of 
international law by each side in the perception of the other, and is the regulatory mechanism by which the 
content of that legal relationship is fleshed out: a clash of coercion, by which the effective interpretation of 
the disputed law is decided...  War is simultaneously a violation of international law and international law in 
action.”  (emphasis in original)  As Miéville argues, the law-breaking aspect of war (and indeed war itself, 
despite its omnipresence in capitalist modernity) is generally described by the participants as either 
aberrant/pathological and/or instances of ‘pure politics’ in order to attempt to alleviate the cognitive 
dissonance inherent in the fact that “[d]uring war, large numbers of violators loudly proclaim the very law 
they violate”. 
117 Ibid, p135, quoting Akehurst, M. A Modern Introduction to International Law (6 edn.) (Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1987), p7 (emphasis added by  Miéville).  Harris echoes this view, saying that “[n]o writer would 
seem to dissent from the view expressed by Brierly that, in terms of the number, as opposed to the political 
importance, of the occasions on which international law is complied with, it is more honoured in the 
observance than in the breach”.  (Harris, (2004), pp6-7)  Jessup, similarly, argues that “[w]ars, breaches of 
treaties, oppression of the weak by the strong, are the headlines of the daily press and of the history 
textbooks.  The superficial observer has not noted the steady observance of such treaties as that under which 
letters are carried all over the world at rates fixed by the Universal Postal Union.  He ignores the fact that 
there is scarcely an instance in two hundred years in which an ambassador has been subjected to suit in courts 
of the country where he is stationed... the instances in which judgements of international tribunals have been 
flouted are so rare that the headline-reader may well place them in the man-bites-dog category”.  (Jessup, A 
Modern Law of Nations (The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp6-8) 
118 Lukács (1971) pp256-272 
119 Cover, R. “Violence and the Word” Yale Law Journal 95 (1986) p1607 39 
 
If we accept Pashukanis’ contention that law is best described as a relationship, however, it 
comes  as  no  surprise  that  most  rules  “relate  to  violations  of  criminal  or  civil  law... 
determine a sanction, or else contain the procedural rules applicable when a rule has been 
violated [and thus] deviation from a norm always constitutes their premise”.
120  We can see 
that while the violation of a norm is an action distinguishable from obedience to it, the 
logic involved in, and the relationship underlying, violation is no more opposed to, or 
exclusive of, obedience than that of making, side-stepping or changing that norm – all are 
‘legal’ in nature insofar as they are orientated around legal norms, the reified products of 
interactions between legal subjects.
121  The choice of how to engage with legal norms is to 
a large extent a matter of tactics (whether between individuals, factions within a class inter 
se  or  between  classes),
122 although  this  ‘choice’  is  subject  to  structural  constraints 
including ideological (pre)determination. 
 
Both domestically and internationally, capitalists are more readily able to use relations 
other than norm-affirmation to their advantage, as when they tend to reject legal norms 
they do so from positions of power in areas of law that are more uncertain than those 
which have the most repressive effects on the proletariat and weak states.
123 (Though there 
is much of value in the ‘indeterminacy thesis’ expounded by some working within the 
‘Newstream’/NAIL tradition, it would be obtuse to deny that some disputes are more easily 
and  predictably  determinable  in  concrete  situations  than  others.)    Domestically  this  is 
evidenced by comparing constitutional and criminal law; internationally the comparison 
may be made between the vague and often contradictory law on the use of force under the 
UN Charter and the detailed transnational economic regime of the General Agreement on 
                                                           
120 Pashukanis, E. “The General Theory of Law and Marxism” in Beirne, Piers Sharlet (eds.) Pashukanis: 
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (Academic Press, London, 1980a), p110 quoted in Miéville (2006), 
p135 (emphasis added by  Miéville) 
121 It is a feature of the English language that the word ‘legal’ elides two importantly different meanings, as 
can be seen from, for example, the Collins English Dictionary: Millennium Edition, p884: “legal ('liːgᵊl) adj 
1 established by or founded upon law; lawful.  2 of or relating to law...”  In describing norm-following and 
norm-violation as both ‘legal’, the second definition (which overlaps with the term ‘juridical’) is engaged: in 
setting up the (il)legality binary, the first is engaged. 
122 See Knox (2009), pp433-435, Chimni, B.S. “International Institutions Today: an Imperial Global State in 
the Making” E.J.I.L Vol.15 No.1 (2004), p3 and Lukács (1971) pp256-272 
123 In fact, the proletariat is doubly constrained for, as Rasulov argues, not only is law-violation easier for 
capitalists, but also “[t]he use of law[-affirmation] as a political medium does not work as easily on the 
counter-hegemonic side as it does on the side of the ‘imperial power’.”  (Rasulov (2010), p468)  This is, of 
course, far from accidental: given the greater influence on the creation of law which the capitalist class is 
able to have, it is in its interests to (re)produce vagueness in areas in which it may have to resort to tactics 
other than simple law-affirmation, and to foster clarity in areas in which the proletariat may seek to do so. 40 
 
Trade in Services (GATS) produced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
124 
 
If  we take  Pashukanis’  initial  insight
125 of seeing law as a type of relationship, add 
Miéville’s  focus  on  the  moment  of  dispute,  integrate  Lukács’  theory  of  reification  to 
account for the existence of legal norms, and follow the resulting analysis, we go from 
having one type of relationship to at least three types of legal relationship, each of which 
has the capacity to affect the others in complex and subtle ways.  Too narrow a focus on 
the relationship of the dispute therefore runs the risk of obscuring that international law is 
not in fact, as a simplistic reading of Pashukanis might suggest, a singular relationship.
126  
It is instead a network of them, and just as international law is more than the sum of the 
laws which make up its content, so too is internati onal law more than the sum of the 
relationships which make up its form. 
 
Speaking of relationships gives us the  form  of  international  law,  and  introducing  the 
concept of reification begins to explain how it is possible for these relationships to affect 
one another, but what is still missing is an account of the structure of the totality of legal 
relationships  and  how  this  structure  is  enmeshed  with  the  wider  social  structures  of 
international politics and the global economy.
127  Additionally, this view of international 
law risks producing an analysis which, in focusing directly on relationships between legal 
subjects  and  not  on  the  ways  in  which  these  are  mediated  (through  institutions, 
professionals, ideologies, etc.), cannot account for important ways in which international 
law is experienced by those legal subjects.  For this, we must turn to Althusser and the 
concept of the Apparatus. 
 
From form to structure: viewing law as apparatus 
 
Although Althusser never explicitly defines the term ‘apparatus’, apparently thinking it 
self-evident,  and  despite  the  fact  that  he  treats  the  legal  apparatus  in  a  somewhat 
                                                           
124 For a good critique of the GATS regime, see Cutler, A. “Toward a Radical Political Economy Critique of 
Transnational Economic Law” in Marks (2008), pp 199-219  
125 For the source of this insight, see the work of Pashukanis’ teacher, Stučka. (Stučka (1988), p27) 
126 It also, as argued above, obscures the fact that in “[b]oth international and nation-state law... law operates 
more in the routines of everyday life than in moments of trouble”.  (Merry (2007), p183) 
127 Pashukanis and Miéville in this regard provide little more than examinations of the similarities between 
the legal form and the commodity form, and analysis of whether or not the legal form should be considered 
as part of the base or superstructure (which is of course based on the assumption that the much-contested 
base-superstructure metaphor is still, or was ever, as theoretically useful as it seems to have been popular). 41 
 
theoretically confused manner,
128 combining the core element of his theory with insights 
taken from theorists who have further developed it allows us to understand the nature of 
the ‘legal apparatus’ or, more precisely, the nature of those aspects of the broader network 
of (state) apparatuses which form an integral part of the legal order. 
 
Apparatuses,  for  Althusser,  are  “realities  which  present  themselves  to  the  immediate 
observer in the form of distinct and specialised institutions”
129 or rather networks of such 
institutions (as each apparatus is not simply formed from one single institution).  This can 
be seen in Althusser’s argument that “the State apparatus... means: not only the specialised 
apparatus (in the narrow sense) whose existence and necessity I have recognised in relation 
to the requirements of legal practice, i.e. the police, the courts, the prisons; but also the 
army...  and  above  this  ensemble,  the  head  of  State,  the  government  and  the 
administration”.
130  This, though an important point, still requires the unpacking of what is 
meant by an Institution.  As Göran Therborn explains, we should view an institution “not 
as  a  goal-oriented  subject  in  an  environment  but  as  a  formally  bounded  system  of 
structured processes within a global system of society processes”.
131  Interactions amongst 
institutions do not therefore replace interactions amongst individuals, either ontologically 
or  epistemologically.    Instead,  institutions  exist  as  structured  fields  through  which 
individual (and, according to the Marxian account, class) relations take shape.  Institutions 
are not only fields for class struggle, however, “but also the outcome of class relations.  
They are ways of sedimenting and storing social advantages in the form of established 
processes, routines, procedures and technologies”
132 which are specific to those institutions 
and concretised in the actions of those who (inter)act through them. 
 
The  Pashukanite  conceptual  framework,  unless  augmented  by  these  insights,  does  not 
provide space for the recognition that law is not only made up of relationships (which can 
                                                           
128 After stating that the Repressive State Apparatus contains “the Government, the Administration, the 
Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc.” (Althusser (2008), pp16-17), and listing as an Ideological 
State Apparatus (ISA) the ‘legal ISA’, Althusser throws into a footnote the theoretically important claim that 
“[t]he ‘Law’ belongs both to the (Repressive) State Apparatus and to the system of the ISAs” (Althuser 
(2008), p17 footnote 9), without providing any explanation.  Since Althusser argues that no apparatus is 
solely Repressive or Ideological, but acts through both repression and ideology, it cannot be said that this 
element of Althusser’s theory provides the missing explanation. 
129 Ibid, p17 
130 Ibid, p11 (emphasis in original) 
131 Therborn, G. What Does the Ruling Class do when it Rules? (NLB, London, 1978), p37.  For an 
interesting discussion of the organisational structuring of social relations from both Weberian and Marxian 
perspectives, see Beetham, D. Bureaucracy (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987) 
132 Savage, M. Class Analysis and Social Transformation (Open University Press, Buckingham, 2000), p124 
(emphasis added).  The Westphalian nation-state, often considered to consist of a collection or system of the 
traditional institutions of government, can itself be conceptualised, in light of this definition, as an institution. 42 
 
be mapped onto Althusser’s discussion of state  power), but also the institutions which 
mediate those relationships and which cannot simply be reduced to them (though it is true 
that  the  internal  procedural  rules  of  these  institutions  are  as  much  reifications  of 
relationships  as  the  substantive  legal  rules  analysed  above).
133   This  dual  nature  is 
evidenced by the fact that, although they are linked, state  power, the expression of the 
asymmetry of class relations  of domination, and the state  apparatus, those institutions 
through which that power is exercised, are distinguishable in both theory and practice: 
 
“We know that the State apparatus may survive... political events which affect the 
possession of State power.  Even after a social revolution like that of 1917, a large 
part of the State apparatus survived after the seizure of State power by the alliance 
of the proletariat and the small peasantry”.
134 
 
Speaking  only  of  legal  relationships,  whether  in  dynamic/immediate  or  reified/frozen 
forms, cannot provide a theory which accounts for this ‘stickiness’ of institutions and the 
reasons why certain relationships are mediated in certain ways in certain historical epochs.  
Recognising that international law gains its materiality and structure through apparatuses, 
however,  and  locating  legal  relationships  within  these,  allows  the  conceptual  space 
necessary for such an explanation.  
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acted within, upon and between them. 
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Chapter 3 – The state of ‘the State’ 
 
The Althusserian conceptual schema of multiple state apparatuses is clearly relevant to 
domestic  Marxian  legal  scholarship  in  which  the  legislative,  judicial  and  policing 
institutions are seen as natural objects of study on both sides of Hunt’s divide between 
analyses of the legal “regulation of the social relations of production (in particular property 
and contract relations) and… the role of law in the preservation of class domination (in 
particular embodied in criminal and constitutional law)”.
135  Indeed, the latter two fields 
are traditionally viewed as inseparable from the nature and function of the (nation-)state as 
an overarching authority in the domestic legal order. 
 
However,  an  attempt  to  introduce  the  same  schema  into  international  Marxian  legal 
scholarship  appears  counterintuitive:  not  only  are  criminal  and  constitutional  law 
discourses  almost  entirely  absent  (and,  at  least  according  to  orthodox  accounts,  there 
appear to be no phenomena analogous enough to domestic criminal and constitutional law 
even to give rise to such discourses)
136 but also the lack of a centralised, supranational, 
political apparatus is so apparently obvious that it is a tacit feature of the very definition of 
international law used by many orthodox scholars
137 (and even some Marxist ones).   
 
 
                                                           
135 Hunt (1981), p63 
136 Two phenomena appear to present themselves as exceptions: firstly, the adoption of a formal Constitution 
by the (supranational) European Union and, secondly, the establishment of the ICC and various ad-hoc 
international criminal tribunals.  However, both of these phenomena are somewhat anomalous.  The former is 
highly specific to a particular region and historical conjuncture, and as such has had little impact on the 
wider field of international law practice or scholarship.  The latter, with its explicit recognition of individuals 
as actors with legal rights and responsibilities, and a focus largely on actions carried out by governments 
against their own citizens within particular states, has never sat particularly comfortably within the 
traditional, statocentric, discourse. 
137 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law 
Institute, 1987), states that “[t]he international political system is loose and decentralized...  There is no 
‘world government’ as the term ‘government’ is commonly understood.  There is no central legislature with 
general law-making authority; the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations influence the 
development of international law but only when their product is accepted by states...  There is no executive 
institution to enforce law; the United Nations Security Council has limited executive power to enforce the 
provisions of the Charter and to maintain international peace and security, but it has no authority to enforce 
international law generally...  There is no international judiciary with general, comprehensive and 
compulsory jurisdiction; the International Court of Justice decides cases submitted to it and renders advisory 
opinions but has only limited compulsory jurisdiction.”  Furthermore, John Austin famously claimed that 
international law is not ‘properly so-called’ because law is ‘the command of the sovereign’ and there is no 
supranational sovereign entity. (See Austin, J. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Prometheus 
Books, Amherst, 2000)  For more examples see Miéville (2006), pp18-19 and Brierly, J. The Law of Nations 
(1963) pp68-76 quoted in Harris (2004), p 4 44 
 
International law scholarship, the (nation-)state and the problem of structure 
 
Orthodox scholarship on state and structure 
 
As Ulrich Beck argues, orthodox international law scholarship largely fails to distinguish 
“between statehood – as a basic principle of modernity – and forms of concepts of the state 
– in the sense of different basic institutions of modernity that lend concrete shape to the 
principle of statehood”.
138  In doing so, it treats the former, the State, as reducible to the 
particular  form  of  the  state  apparatus  in  capitalist  modernity,  the  nation-state,  as 
exemplified by the system of rules centred around the Montevideo Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, “commonly accepted as reflecting... the requirements of statehood at 
customary international law”.
139  The convention declares that “[t]he State as a person of 
international law should possess...  (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States”.
140  Although there 
are debates within mainstream scholarship over whether the Montevideo requirements are 
exhaustive, and over the significance for the status of a polity of the recognition of it as a 
state,
141 the one thing which all the participants of these debates seem to share is the view 
that the State is the “sovereign [nation-]state… internally supreme over the territory it 
controls”
142 and the sole, unified representative of that territory on the world stage.  This is 
a view of the State “essentially based on the imagery of a billiard ball: ‘opaque, hard, 
clearly defined spheres’ interacting with one another only ‘through collision’”
143 (or in 
other words, a bounded and non-porous entity, interacting internationally as a monolithic 
subject-object), embodied in the traditional governmental institutions and aiming to secure 
the  performance  of  very  particular  (and  from  the  Marxian  perspective,  essentially 
inconsequential)  rituals  of  sovereignty  such  as  concluding  treaties  and  engaging  in 
diplomatic relations.  This simplistic and superficial account of the State, naturally, leads to 
                                                           
138 Beck, U. Power in the Global Age (Polity, Cambridge, 2005), p257 (emphasis in original) 
139 Harris (2004), p99 
140 Article I, Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), reproduced in Harris (2004), p99 
141 Some scholars argue that recognition is merely indicative of whether a particular polity is a state, while 
others argue that recognition is actually partly constitutive so that a polity is only a state when generally 
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142Beeson,  M.,  “Sovereignty  under  Siege:  Globalisation  and  the  State  in  Southeast  Asia”,  Third  World 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No.2 (2003) p359 
143 Rasulov (2010), p470 45 
 
a view of the international legal order as one constituted primarily (if not entirely) by 
easily cognisable horizontal inter-state interactions.
144 
 
Marxian scholarship on state and structure 
 
The ‘commodity-form theory’ of international law 
 
This simplistic view of the State, leading to the assumption that international law is ‘law 
without a State’ and law without need for a State, is also a defining feature of Miéville’s 
‘commodity-form theory of international law’.  Rather than being a direct importation of 
the  orthodox  conception,  however,  it  is  derived  from  Pashukanis’  argument  that  “[n]o 
matter how eloquently the existence of international law is proved, the fact of the absence 
of an organisational force, which could coerce a state with the same ease as a state coerces 
an  individual  person,  remains  a  fact.    The  only  real  guarantee  that  the  relationships 
between bourgeois states... will remain on the basis of equivalent exchange... is the real 
balance of forces.”
145  Miéville accepts that “Pashukanis’s essay on the subject was written 
before the era of the UN and the chaotic multilateral developments of decolonisation”,
146 
but argues it remains relevant because the international institutions which have appeared 
since  have  neither  developed  the  requisite  degree  of  centralisation,  nor  acquired  the 
capacity for effective enforcement of their policies and decisions independent of nation-
states.
147  Therefore, his examination of actually-existing international legal relationships, 
in light of his conclusion that international law is law properly so -called, suggests to 
Miéville that the state as “abstract arbiter, a public authority, is in fact contingent to the 
legal form”,
148 however important in functional terms it may be vis-à-vis the domestic 
legal order.  He even argues: 
                                                           
144 See, for example Akehurst (1987), p1, Shearer, I.A. Starke’s International Law (11
th edn.) ( Butterworths, 
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“[L]aw itself – in its earliest, embryonic form – is a product precisely of the lack of 
such  authority...    (proto-)international  law  historically  predates  domestic  law... 
because law is thrown up by and necessary to a systematic commodity-exchange 
relationship,  and  it  was  between  organised  but  disparate  groups  without  super-
ordinate authorities rather than between individuals that such relationships sprang 
up.”
149 
 
The  veracity  of  this  as  a  historical  claim  is  dealt  with,  below.    At  this  point  what  is 
important is Miéville’s contention that the international legal order is a purer example of 
the  legal  form  because  of  its  lack  of  an  overarching  State.    Leaving  aside  the  rather 
unhelpful  reintroduction  of  metaphysical  distinctions,  this  appears  to  contradict 
Pashukanis’  own  position  on  the  matter  insofar  as  he  argues  that  “[c]oercion...  as  the 
imperative addressed by one person to another, and backed up by force, contradicts the 
fundamental  precondition  for  dealings  between  the  owners  of  commodities”.
150   This 
suggests the State – understood in the classical Engelsian sense as an abstract ‘third force’ 
– is a necessary guarantor of the commodity relation because it purportedly ‘steps in’ to 
replace direct coercion by legal subjects and, as argued by the ‘state derivation’ theorists, it 
could be said that State mediation is logically necessary for the development of any society 
that has a class structure.
151 
 
Classical Marxism 
 
Pashukanis and the ‘state derivationists’ both employ, explicitly or implicitly, the classical 
Marxist  definition  of  the  State  expounded  most  clearly  in  Engels’  The  Origin  of  the 
Family, Private Property and the State and Lenin’s State and Revolution (which itself 
draws heavily on Engels’ work).  For Engels: 
 
“The state is... by no means a power forced on society from without...  Rather, it is 
a product of society at a certain stage of development; ...in order that... classes with 
conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile 
struggle, a power apparently standing above society became necessary that for the 
purpose of moderating the conflict and keeping it within the bounds of ‘order’; and 
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this  power,  arising  out  of  society,  but  placing  itself  above  it,  and  increasingly 
alienating itself from it, is the state.”
152 
 
Public power, according to Engels, expresses itself in the ‘self-acting armed organisation 
of the population’ in ancient polities.  However, this becomes impossible with the class 
stratification of society and so this power takes on a particular form: “it consists not merely 
of  armed  men  but  of  material  appendages,  prisons  and  institutions  of  coercion  of  all 
kinds”.
153  As Lenin explains: 
 
“The  state  is  the  product  and  the  manifestation  of  the  irreconcilability  of  class 
antagonisms.  The state arises when, where and to the extent that class antagonism 
objectively cannot be objectively reconciled...  [and exists as] an organ of class 
rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it creates ‘order’, which 
legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the collisions between the 
classes.”
154 
 
This moderation, however, does not alter the fact that society is split into antagonistic 
classes whose ‘self-acting arming’ would end in armed struggles between them  and this is 
why, according to Lenin, every revolution, by destroying the state apparatus, shows us the 
naked  class  struggle  which  was  previously  hidden.    David  McLellan  puts  all  this 
particularly concisely in his statement that “Lenin’s direct and simple definition of the state 
is that ‘the State is a special organisation of force: it is an organisation of violence for the 
suppression of some class’”.
155 
 
The contingency of the state 
 
In contrast,  Miéville claims the State is  not  necessary for the functioning of domestic 
capitalism – and thus the facsimile of it at the global level suggested by an application of 
the  Althusserian  schema  is  not  necessary  for  the  functioning  of  global  capitalism  – 
because,  contra  Pashukanis,  “violence  and  coercion  are  immanent  in  the  commodity 
relationship itself... [and so] in legal systems without superordinate authorities self-help – 
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the coercive violence of the legal subjects themselves – regulates the legal relation”.
156  At 
first  glance this  appears convincing, particularly in  the  domestic legal  order  where,  as 
Pashukanis’  observes,  in  times  “of  intensified  revolutionary  struggle...  the  official 
apparatus  of  the  bourgeois  state  recedes  into  the  background  in  comparison  with  the 
‘voluntary guards’ of the fascists...  [and] ‘seeks salvation’, not by creation of ‘an authority 
standing  above  classes’,  but  by  the  maximum  pressure  of  the  forces  of  the  struggling 
classes”.
157   However,  this  leaves  unanswered  the  crucial  question  of  whom  or  what 
determines the conditions for the resort to self-help and sets the limits of its use. 
 
The  resort  to  self-help  is  an  integral  part  of  Kelsen’s  claim  that  international  law  is 
analogous to ‘primitive’ or tribal law: 
 
“The dynamics of the primitive legal order has only two stages: the development of 
the general norm through custom, and its application by the subject whose interests, 
protected by this norm, have been violated.  This subject is authorised by the legal 
order to react against the violator of the law with the sanction provided by the law.  
Primitive law is characterised by the technique of self-help...  The subject himself 
must fulfil the sanction without its being decreed by an individual norm, which an 
organ different from the injured subject must enact and execute.”
158 
 
At first glance, such an argument appears to support Miéville’s assumptions.  However, on 
closer inspection, it can be seen that Kelsen draws an important distinction between ‘the 
legal order’, which for Kelsen is interchangeable with the State ‘in a broader sense’, and an 
‘organ different from the injured subject’, which is part of the (nation-)state ‘in a narrower 
sense’ as simply the aggregate of such organs.  Even in the absence of state organs, it 
remains the State which determines the conditions for the resort to self-help and sets the 
limits of its use (and, in the language of the Hale and the Realists, shapes “two particularly 
important general categories of rules...  the rules governing the conduct of the parties [in a 
particular situation]...  [and the] rules that structure the alternatives”
159 through its strategic 
(in)action).
160 
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Unpacking ‘the state’ 
 
Even  disregarding  the  realist  and  Kelsonian  counterarguments,  the  core  problem  with 
Miéville’s argument is that it does not actually prove that the State is contingent to the 
international legal apparatus, as he claims.  What it proves – and this is, of course, a far 
less radical conclusion - is that the institutions of the bourgeois nation-state are contingent 
to legal relationships.  Put simply, Miéville’s analysis overreaches itself because it lacks 
Althusser’s  distinction  between  state  power  and  state  apparatus
161  which  is  the 
prerequisite for a nuanced account which does not limit itself to what Poulantzas calls a 
“narrow, juridical definition of the State… always limited to the public kernel of army, 
police, prison, courts, and so on”
162 (which Althusser calls the ‘repressive state apparatus’ 
or RSA).  Indeed, Althusser’ discussion of apparatuses is centred around his theory that the 
state  is  not  only  the  traditional  institutions  (of  repression,  viewed  from  a  Marxist 
standpoint), but that also “included in the strategic field of the State”
163 are a network of 
institutions  (which  mainstream  legal  theory  would  consider  ‘private’,  and  thus 
fundamentally  different  in  character  to  ‘public’  state  institutions)  which  Althusser 
characterises as ‘ideological state apparatuses’ or ISAs. 
 
It is useful here to note briefly that this argument lets us side-step the risk, avoided only 
narrowly by Gramsci, of being caught in a dichotomy ‘between consent and coercion’.  As 
recognised by Althusser, “[a]ll the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by 
ideology,  with  the  difference  [being]  that  the  (Repressive)  State  Apparatus  functions 
massively and predominantly by repression, whereas  the  Ideological  State Apparatuses 
function  massively  and  predominantly  by  ideology”.
164   These  two  poles  are  at  once 
avoided  and  reconciled  in  the  realisation  that  “[t]here  is  no  such  thing  as  a  purely 
repressive apparatus...   There is  no such thing as  a purely ideological  apparatus...  this 
double ‘functioning’... make[s] it clear that very subtle explicit or tacit combinations may 
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be woven from the interplay”
165 between them when a strict methodological separation is 
rejected. 
 
In  the  context  of  the  nation-state  Althusser  provides  a  non-exhaustive  list  of  these 
apparatuses: the RSA, consisting of “the Government, the Administration, the Army, the 
Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc.”
166  and the ISAs, consisting of religion, the education 
system,  the  family,  the  political  system,  workplace  organisations,  telecommunication 
networks and the cultural arena of literature, sport, the Arts, etc.  In orthodox accounts, of 
course, the former category is  assigned the label of  public, and the latter, private.   In 
answer to the question of how social structures in the private domain may be regarded as 
state apparatuses, Althusser explains that “Gramsci already forestalled this objection... The 
distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law... 
[The State] is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any 
distinction between public and private”.
167  It is thus unimportant whether apparatuses are 
‘public’ or ‘private’; what matters is how they function.  In analysing this function, it is 
necessary to take into account the fact that the boundaries between the apparatus categories 
are also permeable: depending on the underlying dynamics of the relations of production 
expressed within them, “apparatuses can slide from one sphere to the other and assume 
new functions either as additions to, or in exchange for, old ones”.
168 
 
The  complexity  of  a  State  constituted  not  simply  by  the  governmental  apparatus,  but 
instead by a diverse and fluid set of heterogeneous state apparatuses, means that it is not, as 
most orthodox (and some Marxian) accounts may suggest, cognisable as a simple and 
unified pyramid whose summit, in the form of a centralised administration, need only be 
occupied to gain State power.  Neither, as a more nuanced theory might posit, is it simply a 
multi-level network where State power is distributed across stable and predetermined ‘key’ 
institutional structures.  Instead, what is required is a nodal model in which State power is 
recognised as a much more complex phenomenon in terms of both where and how it is 
exercised.  Just such a model is offered by Poulantzas, as can be seen in the warning he 
offers to activists within the socialist movement: 
 
“(a) …the formation of a Left government does not necessarily... entail that the Left 
exercises real control over all, or even certain state apparatuses.  This is all the 
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more so in that the state institutional structure allows the bourgeoisie to meet a 
popular accession to power by permutating the sites of real and formal power. 
(b) Even when a Left government really controls state... apparatuses, it does not 
necessarily control the one or ones which play the dominant role in the State and 
which therefore constitute the central pivot of real power... the organisation of the 
bourgeois State allows it to function by successive dislocation and displacement 
through which the bourgeoisie’s power may be removed from one apparatus to 
another: the State is not a monolithic bloc, but a strategic field... 
(c) …each apparatus… is organised around a centre whose effective power is not 
located at the summit of the hierarchy as it appears...  Even if the Left in power 
manages to control, in their formal hierarchy, the heights of the dominant state 
apparatus or apparatuses, it remains to be seen whether it will really control the 
core of their effective power.”
169 
 
What this shows is that to be able to map where power lies in any particular sate, it is 
necessary to investigate not just the form of its government, or even the relative positions 
of the individual apparatuses within that State, but – since that those apparatuses are “not 
only the  stake, but also the  site[s]”
170 of struggles over State power  – the logical  and 
historical conditions which have shaped those relations of struggle and the (corresponding) 
intricate  and  overlapping  institutional  structures  through  which  those  relations  are 
materialised.  Put differently, in a Marxian analysis of the legal order it is important to 
investigate both the current condition and the logical and historical development of three 
of  its  key  features  –  the  methods  and  techniques  of  its  administration,  the  web  of 
institutions through which this administration is materially effected, and the class struggle 
which both determines the conditions of this administration and is that which is being 
administered. 
 
The (re)turn to historic analysis 
 
Although both logical and historical analyses are important, it is not enough to ‘add in’ 
historical analyses once logical analysis has been carried out; the theoretical account must 
from the start be sensitive to the actual-existing historical trajectory and processes through 
which  the  nation-state  –  whose  rise  coincides  with  the  rise  of  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production – developed and spread on a global scale.  As John Holloway and Sol Picciotto 
argue: 
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“It makes little sense to talk of the capitalist ‘forms’ of social relations at all unless 
one has other forms in mind, unless one regards these forms as transitory...  Form 
analysis is analysis of an historically determined and historically developing form 
of social relations, and it is hard to see how an adequate form analysis can be 
anything other than historical.”
171 
 
Miéville’s  chronology  of  the  progression  from  pre-national  polities  with  proto-
international law to international law proper, for example, is an attempt at this but is too 
reductionist to be persuasive (it posits as smooth, universal and simple a process which 
more historically robust accounts have shown to be uneven, temporally and territorially 
dependent  and  complex)  and  it  is  tellingly  devoid  of  historical  references  despite  its 
abundance of theoretical ones.
172 
 
This can be contrasted with Benno Teschke’s account in his book The Myth of 1648: Class, 
Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations
173 which not only discusses 
the  debates  in  international  relations  scholarship  over  the  origins  and  evolution  of  the 
modern states-system and the rival paradigms which attempt to explain the ‘transition to 
modernity’,  but  also  investigates  in  significant  detail  a  range  of  historical  events  and 
epochs  including  Medieval  feudalism,  the  Carolingian  empire,  the  Reconquista,  the 
German  Osteiedlung,  the  Crusades,  the  Norman  Conquest,  French  Absolutism, 
Mercantilism  and  maritime  empire-building,  and  The  Glorious  Revolution.    Teschke 
argues  that  “the  nature  and  dynamics  of  international  systems  are  governed  by  the 
character of their constitutive units, which, in turn, rests on the specific property relations 
prevailing within them”,
174 so that “variations in international patterns of conflict and co-
operation are bound up with changing modes of production”.
175  This not only recognises 
the importance of relations (of circulation) amongst polities, which Miéville focuses on, 
but  also  “that essential  indicator of  bourgeois  [economic] relations  – the extraction of 
surplus  value  by  the  class  owning  the  means  of  production”
176 within  polities  –  about 
which he says very little.  While Miéville argues that class relations of production are 
expressed in legal content, in specific international norms, Teschke’s analysis shows that 
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class relations of production determine not only this, but also the structure and functioning 
of the global political order through the determination of the institutional form taken by 
polities (whether the modern nation-state or otherwise). 
 
 
International law scholarship and the contemporary conjuncture 
 
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, both orthodox and Miéville’s international law 
scholarship share an outmoded view of global society and a simplistic view of the State.  
The  foregoing  analysis  has  sought  to  correct  the  latter  but,  while  it  has  important 
implications  for the former, it does  not  address  it directly:  even with  a more nuanced 
understanding of the State, the assumption that the global social formation is constituted by 
inter-state relations, though rendered more precarious, still stands.  It is therefore necessary 
to turn to a thorough investigation into the structure of the international legal order. 
 
Defining the contemporary conjuncture 
 
The structure of the global order had never been static.  An interesting empirical study of 
its basic structural dynamics (though only insofar as they involve (nation-)states and Inter-
governmental Organisations (IGOs)) is provided by Jason Beckfield.
177  He begins with 
two basic historical facts.  Firstly, the number of states  grew  steadily in the 1800s, 
increased more rapidly after the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 and then, 
“[a]fter 1940, the number of states in the international system grew from 65 to 190 by 
2000”.
178  Secondly, during the same period, the number of IGOs “grew slowly from one 
(the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, whose members were Baden, 
Bavaria,  France,  Germany,  Hesse  and  the  Netherlands)...  to  a  total  of  330  IGOs  by 
2000”.
179  These 330 include, of course, organisations like the UN, IMF, World Bank, ILO 
and WHO which “influence policy, distribute resources, and include nearly every state in 
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the  international  system  as  members”.
180   However,  the  ‘world  polity’,  as  Beckfield 
describes it, also includes and is shaped by “organisations that restrict membership by level 
of  economic  development  (e.g.,  the  Organisation  of  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development),  geographic  region  (e.g.,  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations), 
economic  sector  (e.g.,  the  Organisation  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries),  linguistic 
heritage (e.g., Francophonie Institutionnelle), religion (e.g., Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference), or geopolitical alignment (e.g., the North American Treaty Organisation).”
181 
 
Beckfield’s analysis leads to a model of the global order which “includes two types of 
nodes, states and IGOs, making it a two-mode network...  a network of states that are 
interlinked through memberships in organisation... [and] a network of organisations that 
are  interlinked  through  their  member  states”.
182   Although  his  model  has  important 
limitations because of its highly restricted focus on two types of formal global social actor, 
it does lead Beckfield to an important conclusion: 
 
“[N]early all states have at least one tie to nearly all other states... although they 
may have a greater number of ties to certain states than to others.  And nearly every 
IGO is likely to be connected to nearly every other IGO by at least one common 
member state... but some IGOs may share more member states than others.  This 
suggests  that  in  static  terms,  the  world  polity  blends  structural  density  with 
disintegration,  decentralisation  with  centralisation,  homogeneity  with 
heterogeneity, and cohesion with fragmentation.  Given their theoretical relevance, 
it is essential to estimate these static properties.  But the dynamics matter more.”
183 
 
What must be uncovered, therefore, is the most useful way in which to conceptualise these 
dynamics. 
 
Globalisation 
 
Globalisation is perhaps the most common conceptual framework employed in orthodox 
and critical accounts of the dynamics of the contemporary global order.  Nevertheless, it is 
a complex concept designating a complex phenomenon and to analyse either fully requires 
the  incorporation  of  insights  from  the  works  of  Joseph  Stiglitz,  Stanley  Hoffmann, 
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Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos,  David  Held,  Manuel  Castells  and  Ulrich  Beck.    Santos 
recognises  that  “[t]here  is  strictly  no  single  entity  called  globalisation”.
184   To  this, 
Hoffmann adds an outline of the three forms contemporary globalisation takes.  In cultural 
globalisation “the key choice is between uniformisation (often termed ‘Americanisation’) 
and  diversity”
185  in  Art,  language,  fashion,  media,  etc.    Political  globalisation  is 
characterised by the establishment and spread of “international and regional organizations 
and transgovernmental networks (specializing in areas such as policing or migration or 
justice)...  [and] private institutions that are neither governmental nor purely national – say, 
Doctors Without Borders or Amnesty International”
186 – which relegate the (nation-)state 
to “a reduced role that is mainly limited to social protection, physical protection against 
aggression  or  civil  war,  and  maintaining  national  identity”.
187    Finally,  and  most 
importantly for the current project, there is economic globalisation. 
 
The concept of economic globalisation can be further unpacked according to the Marxian 
distinction  between  relations  of  production  and  exchange/circulation.    It  designates,  as 
Stiglitz argues, “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world... brought 
about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the 
breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and 
(to a lesser extent) people across borders”.
188  However, what is also present, but missing 
from  Stiglitz’  definition,  is  the  “new  international  division  of  labour  based  on  the 
globalisation of production carried out by the transnational corporations (TNCs), which 
are, more prominently than ever, the key agents of the new world economy.  The main 
features  of  the  new  world  economy  are:  worldwide  sourcing;  flexible  systems  of 
production  and  low  transportation  costs  allowing  for  the  production  of  industrial 
components in the periphery and export to the core”.
189 
 
The main problem with the globalisation discourse is the tendency of its account to elide 
all three of the aspects above and reduce them to a simplistic account of the erosion and 
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(eventual)  disintegration  of  the  nation-state  as  a  distinct  and  effective  level  of  social 
cohesion and regulation.  Yet, as Hardt and Negri argue: 
 
 “We must avoid defining [the contemporary conjuncture] in purely negative terms, 
in terms of what it is not, as for example is done when one says: the new paradigm 
is  defined  by  the  definitive  decline  of  the  sovereign  nation-states,  by  the 
deregulation of international markets... and so forth.  If the new paradigm were to 
consist simply in this, then its consequences would be truly anarchic.”
190 
 
Indeed, as Beck recognises, “[w]hat is new in this is not the fact that the strategies of 
capital are putting pressure on states or making them follow their lead – this is exactly 
what political economy has been about from the very beginning – but rather how this is 
being done”.
191  The contemporary conjuncture must  be understood to  involve not  the 
death of the traditional nation-state, but its empirical and conceptual displacement from the 
centre of the global order to a position “in a network of interaction with supranational 
macro-forces and subnational micro-processes”
192 as well as altogether anational processes 
which  generate  “transcontinental  or  interregional  flows  and  networks  of  activity, 
interaction, and the exercise of power”.
193  For a substantial and nuanced account of this, it 
is necessary to turn to the concept of Empire. 
 
Empire-building 
 
The concept of Empire, in the context of the international legal order, requires elucidation 
before the phenomenon it purports to designate can be properly analysed.  As Marks
194 
and, later, Rasulov
195 argue, “[a]ll modern writings that aim to explore the logic of the 
structural relationship between ‘law’ and ‘empire’ in the end invariably come down to 
three principal master-narratives”,
196 each with their own distinct concept of Empire. 
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The  first  view,  which  equates  empire  with  nineteenth-century  European  colonialism, 
invests  the  concept  with  only  historical  significance  because  it  accepts  the  orthodox 
account  that  “[t]he  more  ‘law’  had  found  its  voice,  the  more  it  rose  in  opposition  to 
‘empire’, challenging it and steadily encroaching on its domain, until eventually, with the 
adoption of the epochal UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) in 1961, it delivered 
the final victorious blow, bringing the whole colonial system to its rightful end”.
197  The 
second  recognises  the  continuation  of  imperialist  power,  but  reduces  empire  to  U.S. 
hegemony, with “the boycott of the Kyoto protocol, the ‘un-signing’ of the ICC Statute, 
and  the  establishment  of  the  Guantánamo  prison  being  the  regular  ‘proofs’  of  its 
unimpeded march over the vanquished body of ‘law’”.
198  Both of these, however, are 
problematic: not only does each present a simplistic account of law and power as locked in 
metaphysical opposition (differing only in their assessment of which ‘wins’),
199 but also 
neither captures the complexity of the contemporary structure of the global order. 
 
The third narrative, most famously proposed by Hardt and Negri in their book Empire, is 
by far the most nuanced and theoretically useful in terms of analysing both empire, and its 
relationship to law.  According to this ‘post-structuralist reappropriation of the classical 
Leninist concept of imperialism’, as Rasulov describes it, “at some point following the end 
of the Cold War, the development of global capitalism entered a qualitatively new stage, 
bringing to life an entirely novel system of global governance”
200 which, rather than being 
opposed to law, is bound up with it.  The first two views to a large extent ignore the 
insights gained from the globalisation discourse, remaining within a strictly international 
framework, whereas the third recognises that “no nation-state can today, form the centre of 
an  imperialist  project”
201 because  even  for  the  most  powerful  capitalist  states,  their 
“functions  and  constitutional  elements  [are  being]  displaced  to  other  levels  and 
domains”
202 of sub- supra- and/or a-national natures.  Concomitant to this, pre-existing 
boundaries and divisions between states are dissolving.  (For example the ‘Third World’, 
rather than disappearing, “enters into the First, establishes itself at the heart as ghetto, 
shantytown, favela, always again produced and reproduced.  In turn, the First World is 
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transferred  to  the  Third  in  the  form  of  stock  exchanges  and  banks,  transnational 
corporations and icy skyscrapers of money and command”.)
203 
 
The  resultant  blurring  of  the  traditional  national/international  dualism  is  captured  by 
Beck’s characterisation of the emerging order as a ‘glocal’ arena (a term made from the 
neologistic combination of ‘global’ and ‘local’) in which “[g]lobal politics has turned into 
global  domestic  politics”
204 and  international  law  has  turned  into  (or,  rather,  has  been 
revealed as) global domestic law.  This Beckian ‘glocality’ is ripe for a rigorous Marxian 
analysis  yet,  although  they  draw  heavily  on  Marx  in  other  respects,  Hardt  and  Negri 
instead choose to formulate an account based on Foucauldian biopolitics, positing a global 
order  that  “encompasses  the  spatial  totality...    suspends  history  and  thereby  fixes  the 
existing state of affairs for eternity...  operates on all registers of the social order extending 
down to the depths of the social world....  [and is] the paradigmatic form of biopower”.
205  
This, with its conspicuous absence of class (replaced by the impossibly vague ‘Multitude’) 
and the rejection of structure in favour of an order which is “decentred, kaleidoscopic, 
heterogeneous,  and  irreducible  to  any  single  master-plan”
206  is  a  retrograde  step, 
particularly in light of the valuable insights provided by Marxian scholarship highlighted 
above. 
 
Constitutionalisation and the formation of a ‘nascent (imperial) global state’ 
 
Describing  the  contemporary  conjuncture  using  concepts  taken  from  the  analytical 
framework used by constitutional law scholarship appears at first glance to be a far inferior 
option to those provided by Globalisation and Empire, not least because it risks introducing 
into international legal scholarship the simplistic, uncritical and clichéd debates over the 
nature  and  existence  of  ‘the  social  contract’  which  first  arose  within  domestic 
jurisprudence.  However, it has two major advantages.  Firstly, the advantage it has over 
much of the scholarship which has contributed to the globalisation debate is that it aims at 
an account not only of the processes involved in the contemporary dynamic, but also the 
emergent structure; the newly constituted global legal order.  Secondly, the advantage it 
has over the model provided by Hardt and Negri is that it allows one to take seriously 
Teschke’s conclusion that class relations of production ultimately determine the structure 
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and functioning of the global order.  It is capable of doing so because, from the perspective 
of  Marxian  scholarship,  an  order  capable  of  being  discussed  using  constitutional-law 
concepts  looks  very  much  like  a  State:  a  collection  of  apparatuses  (whether  public  or 
private,  repressive  or  ideological)  which,  while  not  necessarily  being  materialised  in 
traditional  nation-state  institutions,  functions  to  preserve  the  stability  of  the  social 
formation  and  maintain  its  ideological  cohesiveness.    Furthermore,  and  perhaps  most 
importantly, to speak of a State within Marxian scholarship is to speak of a class State.  
Hardt and Negri rightly criticise conceptualisations of the emergent global order which 
simply draw a domestic analogy with the (Westphalian) nation-state, and thus conclude 
that: 
 
“If we were to remain within the conceptual framework of classic domestic and 
international law, we might be tempted to say that a supranational quasi-state is 
being formed.  That does not seem to us, however, an accurate characterisation of 
the situation.”
207 
 
However, as argued above, this is not the only available concept of the State.  To speak of 
a global State is not necessarily to speak of a supra-national facsimile of the nation-state, 
and  in  making  the  assumption  that  it  is,  Hardt  and  Negri  simply  reproduce, 
uncharacteristically,  the  errors  and  limitations  of  orthodox  scholarship.    As  Chimni 
explains,  “[t]he  thesis  that  a  nascent  global  state  has  emerged  assumes  a  particular 
[unorthodox] understanding of ‘state’...  it does not imply... the replacement at a structural 
level of the sovereign state system, but rather its transformation in a manner that facilitates 
the construction of a global state...  constituted at the functional level”
208 by a network of 
public and private international institutions. 
 
 
International law scholarship and the nascent global state 
 
Of course even if this is an interesting definition of the contemporary conjuncture, the 
question  Pashukanis  originally  raised  still  stands,  together  with  those  arising  from  our 
broader, Althusserian concept of the State.  Can we actually see a ‘global state’ which 
maintains a recognisable relationship to law and the economy?  If so, what does it look 
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like?  What are its apparatuses?  How have they arisen?  How does the global RSA relate 
to global ISAs and what role does each of them play? 
 
 
The global state apparatus 
 
Chimni, in his article International Institutions Today: an Imperial Global State in the 
Making,
209 argues  that  international  institutions  have  spread  throughout  all  aspects  of 
international relations (which is supported by Beckfield’s analysis above) and that this 
limits state autonomy, particularly in relation to economic policy-making, which he claims 
has been relocated to international economic institutions (particularly the WTO, IMF and 
World Bank) with effective enforcement powers.  Furthermore, according to Chimni, the 
UN has “embraced the neo-liberal agenda”
210 of promoting transnational capital (in part 
through  increased  private-sector  involvement)  and  is  involved  in  the  erosion  of  the 
traditional prohibition of the use of force in favour of armed humanitarian intervention.  In 
addition,  he  claims  that  several  international  institutions  that  had  “adopted  a  critical 
discourse in the past have been repositioned and normalized”
211 in response to pressure 
exerted by powerful states, while the increase in NGO participation in, and influence over, 
international institutions extends the reach not  only of  critical groups but also of pro-
capital corporate associations.  These developments, in Althusserian terms, constitute the 
growth of the global ISA(s).  Finally, Chimni argues that a network of sub-national and 
non-governmental organisations and authorities act as “the decentralized instruments of 
global governance”
212 to erode state autonomy from within while international institutions 
do it from without. 
 
The global RSA 
 
As argued above, the ‘role of law in the preservation of class domination’, particularly 
embodied in criminal and constitutional law (as part of the wider RSA), has appeared to be 
missing from international law, and thus its study is often missing from (even Marxian) 
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international legal scholarship.  This is true even of Chimni’s scholarship despite the fact 
that  it  is  viewing  the  global  order  as  a  nascent  global  state  with  its  Beckian  ‘global 
domestic politics’ which provides the bridge for the (re)discovery of this role.  Unlike in 
orthodox scholarship, which restricts its studies of international criminal law to the work of 
the ICC and attendant tribunals, radical international law scholarship must take seriously 
Hardy and Negri’s argument that “the era of major conflicts has come to an end... we have 
entered the era of minor and internal conflicts.  Every imperial war is a civil war”
213 in 
which “military deployment is presented as an internationally sanctioned police action”.
214  
Those  class  factions  in  governmental  control  of  powerful  states  and  international 
institutions are able to mobilise this force in their own interests almost as easily as it can 
mobilise domestic police forces, and this is particularly evident in relation to the Haitian 
coup of February 2004.  As Miéville explains: 
 
“The  February  2004  Haitian  coup  that  saw  the  overthrow  of  President  Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, the subsequent occupation of Haiti by US, Canadian and French 
troops, and their rapid replacement with troops of the UN MINUSTAH mission, 
has been exhaustively and desperately documented by activists and the alternative 
media...    UN  troops  have  justified  Haitian  police  death-squad  attacks...  
MINUSTAH troops have repeatedly besieged, occupied and attacked pro-Lavalas 
slums... in the name of ‘anti-gang’ activity...  [and] MINUSTAH has fired on mass 
demonstrations demanding a return to democracy”.
215 
 
Although Miéville dramatically describes the situation as a “rainbow nation of imperial 
proxy invaders”
216 engaged in “multilateralism as terror”,
217 a more accurate description 
would be ‘multilateralism as a technique of the repressive global state apparatus’.  Indeed, 
this is not brutality for brutality’s sake: specific and identifiable capitalist class factions 
have benefited from this ‘global police action’ in the same way that specific factions of the 
capitalist class benefit when domestic police are used to break strikes and prevent protests.  
Miéville recognises this, and notes that: 
 
“The [post-coup Interim] Latortue government turned its back on the [previous] 
Lavalas  administration’s  efforts  to  crack  down  on  tax  evasion  by  the  rich... 
[f]ertiliser subsidies for poor farmers were cut... the minimum wage... was cut[.]  
The opening up of [a] Haitian zone of brutalised and super-cheap labour just before 
[the lifting of the textile quotas in place since 1961 with the end of the 10-year 
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WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing]... was of great help to ‘big textile’[.]  
The brutalities of the sweatshop labour and their cost-reducing effects are of course 
not a side-effect but the specific desiderata of capital”.
218 
 
The global ISA(s) 
 
Of  course,  just  as  at  the  domestic  level  there  is  more  to  the  State  than  its  repressive 
apparatus, so too is this the case at the global level.  As Knox argues: 
 
“[I]n emphasising ‘war’ as the central form of coercion Miéville is elevating the 
‘political’ aspects of international society over the economic one, something one 
would not necessarily associate with a Marxist approach to international relations... 
throughout  Miéville’s  book  there  is  no  mention  of  the  World  Bank  or  the 
international  Monetary  Fund,  despite  their  increasing  importance  and...  the 
prominent usage of economic sanctions in international law and their role in the 
enforcement of Security Council resolutions and foreign policy more generally.”
219 
 
This omission of war from Chimni’s account, therefore, is far from fatal.  Looking at the 
rest of his conceptualisation of the global state, the features he outlines do in fact reflect 
the ontological state of the State.  The network of global state institutions, and the legal 
relations which constitute them and are mediated by them cross all territorial/geopolitical 
boundaries and all distinctions between levels of the global social formation.  What Chimni 
describes as the growth of ‘decentralised instruments of global governance’ eroding ‘state 
autonomy’ from below, Ann-Marie Slaughter, perhaps more accurately, describes as the 
(nation-)state ‘disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts’: 
 
 “These parts – courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures – are 
networking with the counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that 
constitutes a new, transgovernmental order...  Government institutions have formed 
networks of their own [in addition to inter-national institutions], ranging from the 
Basle Committee of Central  Bankers to  informal  ties  between law enforcement 
agencies to  legal  networks that make foreign judicial decisions  more  and more 
familiar.”
220 
                                                           
218 Ibid, pp86-87 
219 Knox (2009), pp424-425  For a discussion of this sort of use of economic measures, such as import 
restrictions, as foreign policy tools (in this case to influence environmental or labour standards/practices) in 
relation to the rules of the WTO, see Howse, R. and Trebilcock, M.J. “The Free Trade-Fair Trade Debate: 
Trade, Labour and the Environment” in “The Free Trade-Fair Trade Debate: Trade, Labour, and the 
Environment” in Bhandari, J.S. and Sykes, A.O. (eds.) Economic Dimensions in International Law: 
Comparative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp186-234 
220 Slaughter, A-M. “The Real New World Order” Foreign Affairs Issue 76 (Sept/Oct 1997) p184  
Furthermore, as Slaughter argues, “[t]he judges of the supreme courts of Western Europe began meeting 
every three years in 1978...  Meetings between U.S. Supreme Court justices and their counterparts of the 
European Court have been sponsored by private groups, as have meetings of U.S. judges with judges from 63 
 
 
What  is  important  in  this  is  that,  although  functioning  in  a  global  rather  than  merely 
national way, the institutions of the global state include (but are not limited to) the same 
institutions that Althusser identified for the nation-state, with the same staff, the same 
processes and the same relationship to law.
221  Slaughter even goes so far as to argue that, 
“[h]uman rights lawyers are more likely to develop transnational litigation strategies for 
domestic courts than to petition the U.N. Committee on Human Rights”,
222 though this is a 
step further than her argument actually requires.
223 
 
What Chimni describes as the growth of restrictions on ‘state autonomy’ from above can 
also  be viewed  as  the increasing importance of what  Stiglitz calls  those “international 
institutions that have written the rules, which mandate or push things like liberalisation of 
capital markets (the elimination of the rules and regulations in many developing countries 
that are designed to stabilise the flows of volatile money into and out of the country)”,
 224 
privatisation  and  so  on.    To  understand  the  place  of  such  international  economic 
institutions in the apparatus-structure of the global state, it is necessary to look at three 
main institutions: the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT/WTO.
225  These have both 
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repressive and ideological functions.  On the one hand, as Stiglitz (former chief economist 
at the World Bank) explains, “[in the 1980s t]he IMF and the World Bank became the new 
missionary institutions, through which [free-market] ideas were pushed on the reluctant 
poor countries that often badly need their loans and grants”.
226  On the other hand, these 
institutions were able to effect concrete changes in economic policy through  economic 
coercion – the strategic granting or withholding of financial support: 
 
“In the 1980s, the Bank went beyond just lending for projects... to providing broad-
based support, in the form of structural adjustment loans; but it did this only when 
the IMF gave its approval – and with that approval came IMF-imposed conditions 
on the country.  The IMF was supposed to focus on crises; but developing countries 
were always in need of help, so the IMF became a permanent part of life in most of 
the developing world.”
227 
 
Although  the  references  to  ‘developed’  and  ‘developing’  countries  suggests  a  purely 
international analytical framework, Stiglitz does recognise that these institutions are not 
purely, or even primarily organised along national lines.  Although he does not use the 
Marxian vocabulary of class, his analysis points to a system controlled by and primarily 
favouring  not  different  nations  (as  unified  entities)  but  different  factions  of  the 
international capitalist class (industrial, financial, etc.): 
 
“The institutions are dominated not just by the wealthiest industrial countries but by 
commercial and financial interests in those countries...  The choice [of] heads for 
these institutions symbolises [this]... [as does] who speaks for the country.  At the 
IMF, it is the finance ministers and the central bank governors.  At the WTO, it is 
the  trade  ministers.    Each  of  these  ministers  is  closely  aligned  with  particular 
constituencies within their countries.  The trade ministries reflect the concerns of 
the  business  community...    The  finance  ministers  and  central  bank  governors 
typically  are closely tied to  the financial community;  they  come from  financial 
firms, and after their period of government service, that is where they return.”
228 
 
These  institutions  have  important,  concrete,  effects  amenable  to  empirical  analysis,  as 
Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz’s analysis of the GATT/WTO regime 
demonstrates.
229  Although their analysis is engaged in from an orthodox, statocentric, 
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perspective what is valuable is the attempt to “quantify the GATT/WTO’s effect on the 
level and direction of trade”.
230  They reach two important conclusions.  Firstly, “[t]rade 
among those with standing in the GATT/WTO was considerably higher than what one 
would  predict,  based  purely  on  proximity,  national  income,  and  other  non-political 
variables”.
231    Secondly,  each  of  the  eight  round  of  trade  talks  facilitated  by  the 
GATT/WTO, generating a set  of agreements  shared by  all their members, “apparently 
contributed to trade, [though t]he impact of the participation diminished gradually and 
become negligible with the establishment of the WTO after the Uruguay Round.  By that 
time,  only  a  handful  of  countries  remained  outside  the  regime:  a  few  Middle  Eastern 
nations,  formerly  Communist  Countries,  and  microstates.”
232   This  then,  provides  a 
measurable indicator of the globalisation – not only of commodity circulation but also 
commodity  production  (insofar  as  production  has  itself  become  globalised,  as  argued 
below).    While,  because  of  their  theoretical  assumptions,  Goldstein  et  al.  attribute  a 
positive  effect  to  the  transnational  trade  law  which  is  centred  on  this  regime,  Stiglitz 
provides a rather different account: 
 
“[A]fter the last trade agreement in 1995... the net effect was to lower the prices 
some of the poorest countries in the world received relative to what they paid for 
their imports.  The result was that some of the poorest countries in the world were 
actually made worse off.  Western banks benefited from the loosening of capital 
market  controls  in  Latin  America  and  Asia,  but  those  regions  suffered  when 
inflows of speculative hot money (money that comes into and out of a country, 
often overnight, often little more than betting on whether a currency is going to 
appreciate or depreciate) that had poured into countries suddenly reversed.”
233 
 
This is a more concrete expression of Marks’ more general argument: 
 
“[T]he production of ‘under-development’ is not simply spontaneous.  As [Rosa] 
Luxemburg explains, it entails the use of coercive force...  just as the production of 
‘under-development  is  not  a  spontaneous  phenomenon,  it  is  not  an  anonymous 
phenomenon.  Bertolt Brecht once famously quipped that ‘famines do not simply 
occur; they are organised by the grain trade’.  Brecht reminds us here that hunger is 
not simply an objective fact of the world, but a policy option and an outcome of 
decisions taken by particular people in particular contexts.”
234 
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The global class state 
 
As will be recalled, the classical Marxist definition of State explicitly grounds the concept 
in the idea of class struggle.  To understand the phenomenon of the global state, requires, 
therefore answering Chimni’s important questions: “[a]re there global classes? ...How are 
class interests expressed in an inter-state system?  To what extent does the existence of 
sovereign states mean that class interests are manifested in a greatly mediated and indirect 
manner at the global level?”
235 
 
As Rasulov notes, discussing class in the context of international law scholarship appears 
at first somewhat jarring: 
 
“A  common  assumption...  has  come  quietly  to  shape  the  common  theoretical 
horizon  of  modern  international  studies.    Constructed  around  a  fetishistic 
hypostasis of the statal form, it suggests that the analytical apparatus of the Marxian 
class theory has nothing of value to contribute to modern international law... on the 
murky parched planes of the international arena, there are no signs of any class 
struggles to be seen.  The jukebox of global politics plays only the tunes written by 
one set of composers, the national governments of sovereign states and their ever 
more glamorous proxies, the international civil service.”
236 
 
Nevertheless, even though classes are not formally recognised in international law and 
possess  no  immediate  international  legal  agency,  Rasulov  rightly  argues  that  “the 
international legal domain still represents one of the common areas... for the conduct of the 
global class struggle – and thus, by implication, for the constitution of the global class 
structure”
237 or, to put it another way, for the structure of the global class state. 
 
The problem of nation-states as class proxies 
 
Although necessary (and greatly facilitated by the insights from Chimni and others, above) 
the  introduction  of  a  Marxian  class  analytic  into  international  legal  scholarship  is  not 
unproblematic, largely because of the long and sustained use by the latter of ‘the domestic 
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analogy’: a conceptual tool in which (public) international law is described as equivalent 
to the (domestic) law of contract.
238  The problem is not the drawing of analogies between 
domestic and international law as such (it can, as argued in this thesis, in fact be valuable if 
done  correctly),  but  the  often  attendant  (yet  unnecessary)  anthropomorphisation  of  the 
state.
239  There are two problems with this – one practical and one theoretical. 
 
Firstly,  there  is  no  evidence  that  anyone  in  the  international  law  profession  actually 
formulates  their  practice  of  international  law  based  on  this.    For  example,  the  legal 
representative  of  France,  M.  A.  De  La  Pradelle,  discussing  the  meaning  of  territorial 
sovereignty  before  the  ICJ  in  the  Nationality  Decrees  in  Tunis  and  Morocco  case,
240 
openly contradicted it, stating that: 
 
“[T]erritory is neither an object nor a substance; it is a framework.  What sort of 
framework?  The framework within which the public power is exercised... territory 
as such must not be considered, it must be regarded as the external, ostensible sign 
of the sphere within which the public power of the state is exercised.”
241 
 
When viewed in this way, the supposed equivalence between state territories and private 
estates disappears.  National territory is not something separate from the nation-state, but a 
function  of  the  limits  of  the  exercise  of  State  power  on  society.    The  estate  of  the 
individual, however (whether comprising land, property or possessions) is, essentially, a 
collection of things, as there is no internal society, no internal class divisions and struggle, 
from which the individual arises as an abstract ‘third force’. 
 
Secondly it results in a temptation for Marxian international law scholarship to posit a 
simplistic and fetishism-driven equation of the bourgeoisie with ‘first world’ states and the 
proletariat with ‘third world’ states which obscures the actual and much more complex 
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character of the underlying economic (and legal-dispute) process.  Miéville does exactly 
this when he argues that “the logic of modern inter-state relations is defined by the same 
logic  that  regulates  individuals  in  capitalism...  since  the  system’s  birth  –  and  in  the 
underlying  precepts  of  international  law  –  states,  like  individuals,  interact  as  property 
owners”.
242 
 
Miéville’s analysis is not always this simplistic and he remains sceptical of international 
law’s emancipatory potential, but it is exactly the kind of reasoning he engages in, above, 
which can lead to the overestimation of that potential in light of the fact that the working 
class  have  historically  been  able  to  gain  important  concessions  from  the 
bourgeoisie/bourgeois  state  in  domestic  law.    The  most  common  examples  of  such 
concessions are in relation to ‘the length of the working day’, as discussed by Marx in 
Capital,
243 and ‘the Black Act’, as discussed by Thompson in Whigs and Hunters.
244  The 
difference lies in the fact that: 
 
“[In the case of the Black Act] the contending classes fought quite directly to fill 
the  legal  form  with  specific  content,  and  at  particular  points  the  working  class 
triumphed...  However...  [s]tates, not  classes...  are the  fundamental  contending 
agents of international law [which clash in international courts and tribunals]... and 
while their claims and counterclaims are certainly informed by their own domestic 
class struggles, they do not ‘represent’ classes in any direct way – it is generally the 
opposing ruling classes of the different states which are clashing with the legal 
form”.
245 
 
From  this  Miéville  concludes  that,  “[w]hen  it  comes  to  international  law...  the  more 
powerful state, with the coercive strength to enforce its own interpretation of the legal 
rules, is a more powerful capitalist state.  Its interpretations and its coercive efforts are 
deployed for capital, which is predicated on class exploitation”,
246 but this is also true of 
the less powerful state and so, “exceptional circumstances aside, every international legal 
decision represents the triumph of (at least) one national ruling class – it is they after all 
who  have  had  recourse  to  the  legal  form”.
247   Although  this  is  an  important  step  in 
overcoming the problems of anthropomorphisation it, again, does not go far enough.  In 
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light of Stiglitz’s insight about the different (transnational) class factions represented by 
the World Bank/IMF and WTO respectively – and Poulantzas’ insight that “[r]ather than 
facing a corps of state functionaries and personnel united and cemented around a univocal 
political will, we are dealing with fiefs, clans and factions: a multiplicity of diversified 
micro-politics”
248 within each state – it can be seen that ‘every international legal decision 
represents the triumph of one faction of the global ruling class’. 
 
Indeed, to understand the disconnect which Rasulov highlights – the existence of global 
class relations and the blindness of orthodox international law scholarship to them – it is 
necessary again to turn to Lukács.  What his insight reveals here is that the traditional idea 
of  the  global  economy  being  constituted  by  domestic  economies  (inter)acting 
internationally  is  a  product  of  reification  par  excellence;  a  double-reification  of  the 
underlying class relations whereby nation-states not only appear as things able to act on 
their own national class relations from a position of externality (when they are in fact the 
reified products of those relations), but also able to act on/influence other nation-states.
249  
However, a nation-state interacting with another nation-state is, at its heart, one set of class 
relations concentrated within a particular geographical area becoming enmeshed with and 
co-constitutive of, another.  In other words, Lukács’ insights allow us to understand the 
international  relations  amongst  states  as,  ultimately,  the  transnational  relations  of 
individuals and classes.  This, of course, is missed by Miéville because his treatment of 
states as individuals not only fails to challenge, but actually perpetuates, the reification 
which  obscures  national  and  transnational  class  relations  for  international  legal 
scholarship. 
 
Class beyond nation-states 
 
Lukács  provides  a  reason  for  introducing  analysis  of  the  transnational  interaction  of 
national classes into international legal scholarship, but further analysis is required before 
accepting Chimni’s claim that the global order should be viewed as a global state with its 
own immanent class relations involving distinct transnational classes: the Transnational 
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Capitalist Class (TCC), Transnational Middle Class (TMC) and Transnational Working 
Class (TWC). 
 
Since it is productive relations which both  define and produce classes,
250 it is through 
looking  at  the  changing  face  of  contemporary  production  that  the  complexity  of 
contemporary class relations should become apparent.  An important aspect of this change 
– the development of truly global, rather than merely international productive processes – 
is described by Klein: 
 
 “For some companies a plant closure is still a straightforward decision to move the 
same facility to a cheaper locale.  But for others... layoffs are only the most visible 
manifestation of a much more fundamental shift: one that is less about where to 
produce  than  how.    Unlike  factories  that  hop  from  one  place  to  another,  these 
factories  will  never  rematerialise.    Mid-flight,  they  morph  into  something  else 
entirely: ‘orders’ to be placed with a contractor, who may  well turn over those 
orders to as many as ten subcontractors, who – particularly in the garment sector – 
may in turn pass a portion of the subcontracts on to a network of home workers 
who will complete the jobs in basements and living rooms.”
251 
 
As Santos argues, although “the modern world system has always been structured by a 
world class system, a transnational capitalist class is emerging today whose arena of social 
reproduction is the globe as such”.
252  It is therefore necessary, as Leslie Sklair attempts, to 
“establish the TCC empirically by identifying its members and the institutions through 
which they exercise their powers”.
253  The most concise and valuable conceptualisation of 
the  TCC  is  that  provided  by  William  Robinson  and  Jerry  Harris,  who  argue  that  it 
comprises the owners of ‘transnational capital’, or in other words, “the leading worldwide 
means of production as embodied principally in the transnational corporations and private 
financial institutions”.
254  Sklair develops this conceptualisation further by breaking the 
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TCC down into “four main, interlocking groups”
255 or class fractions: “those who own and 
control the TNCs (the corporate fraction), globalising bureaucrats and politicians (the state 
fraction), globalising professionals (the technical fraction), and merchants and media (the 
consumerist  fraction)”.
256   Although this  precise division  is  problematic (ignoring as  it 
does the traditional Marxian analytical distinctions between industrial and finance capital 
and including those, such as bureaucrats and professionals, more properly included with 
the TMC),
257 Sklair’s underlying point remains valid: 
 
“While  each  of  these  groups  performs  distinct  functions,  personnel  are  often 
interchangeable  between  them.    Key  individuals  can  belong  to  more  than  one 
fraction at the same time, and the transition from membership of one to another 
group is more or less routinised in many societies.”
258 
 
To accept Santos’ argument, it is not necessary to assume that class relations have become 
purely transnational, that the TCC and TMC have “replaced the historically much more 
familiar  phenomena  of  national  bourgeoisie  and  national  middle  class”
259 or  that  “the 
emergence of the TWC suggest[s] that the workers of all countries have at long last united 
and now rattle their chains in unison”.
260  As Rasulov reminds us, since “the transnational 
productive process... does not in itself automatically supplant all other types of productive 
processes occurring on a smaller scale”
261 and there remains a significant volume of capital 
not directly produced by transnational industry or finance, then the class in control of the 
transnational  means  of production cannot  be said  to  “automatically replace national  or 
regional-based  capitalist  class  formations”
262 either.    Neither  has  the  TWC  replaced 
National Working Classes (NWCs), and in fact, as Santos argues, “capital has been far 
more successful than wage labour in uniting its forces on a global scale”:
263 not only do 
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NWCs have to deal with exploitation from a TCC that “easily out-manoeuvres... workers’ 
organisations that are still nationally based”,
264 but also still from their own NCCs and 
NMCs  who  share  the  imperative  of  “making  sure  the  maximum  amount  of  work  is 
extracted from each worker, the maximum number of working hours extracted from each 
day”
265.  Just as the birth of the nation-state was an uneven, temporally and territorially 
dependent process, part of the “complex historical co-development (but not co-genesis) of 
capitalism, state and state-system”,
266  the birth of the global state is marked by having to 
“contend with the demands of the logic of the states system”
267 and national class relations, 
even once transnational class relations have taken hold.  The material existence of nation-
states remains, “and no amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve it”.
268  What such 
restructuring can do, however, is explain and demystify that existence and reveal that, 
when studying either the nation-state or the global state, transnational classes are always 
present. 
 
(Trans)national class consciousness 
 
The references to ‘workers’ organisations’ and ‘political will’ raise the familiar question of 
class consciousness,  so  it is  important  to  emphasise that “classes  exist as  a feature of 
objective reality...  The subjective experiences of the participating actors constitute related 
but nevertheless quite different issues for enquiry”.
269  Although a concrete instance of 
purely  national  labour  organisation  is  a  factor  indicative  of  a  national  rather  than 
transnational productive relationship – since it is people’s “social existence that determines 
their consciousness”
 270 –  it is not conclusive: a worker’s organisation may be nationally 
based and its members may self-identify as members of a NWC, yet those members may 
actually  be  part  of  the  TWC  because  they  are  engaged  in  a  particularly  transnational 
productive process (e.g. they work in an EPZ,
271 or in a call-centre engaged in outsourced 
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work for foreign businesses).  This is true also for the TCC/NCCs even though “[w]ithin 
certain parts of Marxism there is a tendency to assume that the bourgeoisie always has 
class-consciousness”.
272  Alasdair Stewart, following Sartre, rightly argues that “it is just as 
probable for the bourgeoisie to remain unconscious as the proletariat.  Sartre meant that the 
bourgeoisie itself may believe the ideology that capitalism benefits everyone in society and 
not be deliberately trying to undermine all efforts by the proletariat”
273 but it can also, in 
this  context,  mean  that members  of  the  TCC may  self-identify  with  a  particular  NCC 
despite being mainly involved in a transnational mode of production with transnational 
class relations, or vice-versa. 
 
Rasulov argues that “[i]nsofar as one’s contribution to the historically existing processes of 
socio-economic production in  which one currently participates  creates  effects, however 
miniscule, beyond one’s immediate geo-economic vicinity, one ineluctably becomes part 
of  one  or  the  other  of  the  three  transnational  classes”.
274   Tension  between  objective 
transnational class membership and national class consciousness would thus not display 
false-consciousness  but  instead  an  individual  holding  multiple  or  contradictory  class 
positions.   Although this  is  a much better explanation, it risks  a conceptual elision  of 
transnational  and  international  class  relations,  which  can  be  avoided  if  individuals’ 
contributions are assessed as a whole rather than against a threshold.  This is important 
because, as Rasulov recognises, the global state is not (or, perhaps not yet) a post-national 
one. 
 
 
International law scholarship, class analysis and the global state’s function 
 
Even  more  important  than  an  investigation  into  the  structure  and  constitution  of 
transnational classes, however, is an investigation into transnational class struggle, as it is 
this which is vital to a Marxian account of the global class state.  The TWC are not a 
passive object existing only to be exploited, to be acted upon: only through class struggle 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and numerous ILO conventions) “international law insists that workers have rights to fair pay and decent 
conditions.  In doing so... its implicit message is that exploitation is work gone wrong.  Exploitative 
employment appears as a kind of pathology of the labour contract.  What the Marxian analysis brings out is 
that, on the contrary, exploitation belongs with the normal functioning of a system in which capital 
accumulation depends on labour exploitation.” (Marks (2008b), p300) 
272 Stewart (2008), p438 
273 Ibid, p438 
274 Rasulov (2008a), p270 74 
 
does the concept of class become imbued with content, and only “from the point of view of 
the  class  struggle,  as  an  apparatus  of  class  struggle  ensuring  class  oppression  and 
guaranteeing the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction”
275 does the global State 
(apparatus) have a material function and existence. 
 
Locating class struggle in the global state, and the State in global class struggles 
 
Class struggle in the global state: beyond classical Marxism 
 
Although the classical Marxist definition of the State is far more useful than the orthodox 
alternative, to understand fully how class struggles become inscribed in the global state it 
is  necessary  to  move  beyond  it  to  the  more  nuanced  conceptualisation  which  can  be 
constructed using the works of Poulantzas and Therborn.
276  This view is one of the State 
as  “a  relationship  of  forces,  or  more  precisely  the  material  condensation  of  such  a 
relationship  among  classes  and  class  fractions”,
277 into  a  network  of  state  apparatuses 
(each forming the “site and a centre of the exercise of [class] power”)
278 which function 
together as a ‘machine’ for the mediation of class antagonisms. 
 
Although starting from an Althusserian conceptualisation of the State, both Poulantzas and 
Therborn  have  more  nuanced  views  of  what  is  meant  by  state  power  and  state 
apparatus(es).  In their accounts “power itself is not a quantity or object of possession, nor 
a quality linked to a class essence or a class subject (the dominant class)”
279 but rather “a 
concept  designating  the  field  of  their  struggle…[that]  designates  the  horizon  of  action 
occupied  by  a  given  class  in  relation  to  others”.
280   Similarly,  a  particularly  nuanced 
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concept of the Apparatus is visible in Therborn’s description of the social-revolutionary 
‘smashing’ of the State: 
 
“Marx and Lenin asserted that the existing state apparatus must be ‘smashed’ in 
any socialist transformation of society.  What are to be smashed are neither the 
various agencies of the state (though some will no doubt be abolished) nor the 
personnel who work in them (though some will have to be removed).  To smash the 
state  apparatus  means  to  smash  the  class  character  of  its  technology  or 
organisation, as well as the manifestations of the latter in the mode of regulating 
tasks, personnel and material resources.”
281 
 
The State is thus not a ‘thing’ external to class relations and “endowed with an intrinsic 
instrumental essence and a measurable power-quantum”.
282  It is neither “created ex nihilo 
by the ruling classes, nor is it simply taken over by them”
283 but is instead “part of [the] 
specific division of labour within [global] society... [and] reflects in a particular way the 
social  division  of  labour  and  the  prevailing  social  class  relations,  contributing  to  their 
reproduction  in  the  ever-ongoing  social  process”.
284   Indeed,  as  Pashukanis  argues, 
“[w]herever there is class division and thus class struggle and power, the State already 
exists as institutionalised political Power.  Thus, [in a class-divided society] there is no 
‘state of nature’ or ‘state of society’ prior to the State”.
285  Similarly, and by no means 
coincidently, “[l]aw is always present from the beginning in the social order: it does not 
arrive post festum to put order into a pre-existing state of nature”.
286   
 
As it is an extension and refinement of Althusser’s conceptualisation of the State, this 
account  involves  the  recognition  of  his  distinction  between  state  power  and  the  state 
apparatus and does not provide a concept of the State which is reducible to class power to 
the exclusion of its existence as a material apparatus.  This is important because class 
power “can exist only insofar as it is materialised in certain apparatuses... [which] are no 
mere appendages of power, but play a role in its constitution”.
287  This means that the 
‘material condensation’ of class relations is a more complex phenomenon than the direct 
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transcription of the power of the TCC equally into each state apparatus.  Instead, (class) 
power relations become “crystallised in the State in a refracted form that varies according 
to the apparatus”
288 in question. 
  
While the autonomy of these global apparatuses from the TCC and each other is “limited 
by the fact that they express the class relations of the same [global capitalist] society... [it 
can also be seen that] at any given moment significant disjunctures appear between [state 
power  and  the  state  apparatus]...  substantially  increased  by  the  coexistence  within  a 
particular state system of several apparatuses, in which different sets of class relations may 
have crystallised”.
289  At the global level, these disjunctures appear because, although the 
global  State  is  a  capitalist  State  organised  along  the  lines  of  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production, within any society several “different modes of production (in a double sense as 
they  exist both  inside nation states  as well  as in the international  system) co-exist”
290 
within it, “as well as three or more classes each capable of different forms of alignment 
[and] often divided into fractions”.
291 
 
This analysis, then, provides the fuel for Poulantzas’ rejection of two (apparently opposite, 
though  crucially  linked)  conceptions  of  the  State:  the  ‘State  as  Thing’  and  ‘State  as 
Subject’.  According to the former,  the dominant class fraction “is supposed to deploy a 
political unity that is somehow prior to state action; the State plays no role in organising 
the bourgeois power bloc”
292 while, according to the latter, State, endowed with reason and 
a unitary will, imposes that will “on the divergent and rival interests of civil society”
293.  
As the analysis above shows, both these conceptions fail to account for the complexities of 
the  apparatus-structure  of  the  global  state,  and  present  an  incomplete  and  misleading 
account of the existence of internal contradictions within the State: “[i]n the first case, 
class contradictions are external to the State; [in the second,] the contradictions of the State 
are external to social classes”
294 yet both sets of contradictions are the same contradictions.  
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289 Therborn (1978), p35  As Therborn goes on to argue, “[a]lthough the state is, in a fundamental sense, 
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granted that they share a common class character...  Within limits imposed by the general nature of the state, 
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tasks of the apparatus and the concerns of classes rooted in the mode of production.  It may thus be expected 
that, allowing for a possible period of revolutionary ‘smashing’, the army of capitalist states would retain 
feudal traits longer than, say, the fiscal apparatus”.  (Therborn (1978), p41) 
290 Chimni (2010), p66 
291 Therborn (1978), p148 
292 Poulantzas (1978), p131 
293 Ibid, p131 
294 Ibid, pp131-132 (emphasis in original) 77 
 
Being a condensation of class relations, the network of state apparatuses, and the global 
State as a whole, cannot help but reproduce the multi-factional and contradictory dynamics 
of the productive relations which result from the (often uneasy) co-existence of diverse 
classes  and  modes  of  production.    This  consequence  is  “concretely  manifested  in  the 
diverse, contradictory measures that each of these classes and fractions, through its specific 
presence in the State and the resulting play of contradictions, manages to have integrated 
into state policy”.
295  The “internal cracks, divisions and contradictions of the State cannot 
represent  mere  dysfunctional  accidents,  since  they  are  organically  linked  to  the 
establishment  of  state  policy  favouring  the  bloc  in  power...    The  establishment  of  the 
State’s policy must be seen [instead] as the result of the class contradictions inscribed in 
the very structure of the State”.
296 
 
The State in global class struggles: function 
 
Although touched upon earlier during the discussion of the legal form, it is only in light of 
the Poulantzasian concept of the State that the function of the international legal order can 
be  fully  understood  because  the  function  of  international  law  and  the  global  state  are 
interdependent  and  inseparable.    This  interdependence  is  not,  however,  simply  mutual 
involvement in  “organised class terror”
297 (exercised by  an authoritarian  administration 
through the patently repressive use of public/criminal law).
298  As Hale argues, in every 
state there exists also latent coercion, exercised on and through property and contract law: 
 
“In  protecting  property  [a  state]  is  doing  something  quite  apart  from  merely 
keeping the peace.  It is exerting coercion wherever that is necessary to protect each 
owner, not merely from violence, but also from peaceful infringement of his sole 
right to enjoy the thing owned.”
299 
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298 The situation in Haiti discussed above is a global example of this, while a domestic equivalent is the 
situation in France in 1968 as described in detail by the Cohn-Bendit brothers in Obsolete Communism: the 
Left-wing Alternative (Penguin, London, 1969)).   
299 Hale (1923), p472  This, as Kennedy explains, provides a valuable counterargument to “rhetoric [which] 
justifie[s] the existing capitalist system on the ground that it [is] based on freedom (the free market, free 
labour, freedom of contract, consumer sovereignty) by contrast to socialism, which supposedly replace[s] all 
these freedoms with their opposite, namely state coercion”: coercion need not take the form of patent 
repression, need not be exercised through criminal law, and is present within the most fundamental rules and 
relationships of the capitalist legal order. (Kennedy (1991), p328) 78 
 
Indeed, Knox’s critique of Miéville’s  reduction of coercion  to  violence and Gramsci’s 
discussion of the phenomenon of hegemony serve as reminders that the global state does 
not typically operate through direct oppression (which we would expect to find in a theory 
of the global state as the will of the TCC) or even (as, at first glance, the above passage 
appears to suggest) merely exist as the ever-present threat of violence, ready to flex its 
muscles on their behalf.
300 
 
Instead, its function in the transnational mode of production is more subtle, pervasive and 
contested: it “marks out the field of struggles, including that of the relations of production: 
it  organises  the  market  and  property  relations;  it  institutes  political  domination  and 
establishes the politically dominant class; and it stamps and codifies all forms of the social 
division of labour – all social reality – within the framework of a class-divided society”.
301  
Rather than simply dominating, it “shapes the materiality of the social body upon which 
domination is brought to bear”
302 in two important ways. 
 
Firstly, as Kennedy (drawing upon the insights of Hale and the Realists) explains: 
 
“[The state is] responsible for the whole network of ground rules within which 
labour conflict is conducted, including such basic rules as that corporations can 
‘own’ factories, that no one ‘owns’ the ocean, that you have no legal obligation to 
help a starving stranger, that workers can sell their labour and must refrain from 
taking its product home with them...  Most of the time, these ground rules of the 
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AIDS drugs by multinational pharmaceutical companies and through the relatively recent developments that 
have rendered genetic modifications (which could improve food yields in areas with poor soil/weather) 
amenable to protection by international patent law. 
302 Poulantzas (1978), p81 (emphasis in original).  For example, rather than forcing people into exploitative 
wage labour which benefits the TCC, the global State produces a legal order in which this state of affairs 
becomes a natural outcome.  As Hale explained, “[u]nless... the non-owner can produce his own food, the 
law compels him to starve if he has no wages, and compels him to go without wages unless he obeys the 
behests of some employer.  It is the law that coerces him into wage-work under penalty of starvation – unless 
he can produce food... but in every settled country there is a law which forbids him to cultivate any particular 
piece of ground unless he happens to be an owner...  Not only does the law of property secure for the owners 
of factories their labour; it also secures for them the revenue derived from the customers.  The law compels 
people to desist from consuming the products of the owner’s plant, except with his consent; and he will not 
consent unless they pay him money”.  (Hale (1923), p473) 79 
 
system are just assumed, as are the hundreds and hundreds of other articulated rules 
that it takes to decide what we mean by ‘owning a factory’.”
303 
 
To the extent that the state uses (patent or latent) force to ‘ensure obedience to the rules of 
the  game’  (or  refrains  from  doing  so)  and  these  rules  affect  the  outcome  when  such 
conflict is played out, “the state is implicated in [that] outcome.  It is an author of the 
distribution [of goods and power] even through that distribution appears to be determined 
solely by the ‘voluntary’ agreement of the parties”.
304 
 
Secondly, the state mediates
305 conflicts within and amongst classes and class factions by 
“represent[ing]  and  organis[ing]  the  long-term  interests  of  a  power  bloc,  which  is 
composed of [TCC] class fractions…  [and organising] the conflictual unity of the alliance 
in power and the unstable equilibrium of compromise among its components... under the 
bloc hegemony and leadership of one class or fraction”.
306  As Stewart explains: 
 
“Poulantzas...  stress[es]  that  a  member  of  the  [TCC]’s  short-term  interest  in 
increasing its own capital puts it at odds with the rest of the [TCC]...  In order that 
the  accumulation  of  capital  can  continue,  the  role  of  the  capitalist  state  is  to 
organise the [TCC] in a power bloc, creating a long-term interest that they lack, and 
to disorganise the [TWC]... [T]he state [can] make some concessions towards the 
[TWC] against the wishes of certain parts of the [TCC] in order to secure the long-
term existence of capitalism.  Essentially, it acts as a valve to release any build-up 
of pressure.”
307 
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305 As Therborn importantly highlights, “[m]ediation here signifies not arbitration, but exercise of class 
power through the state.  The class state does not go between the classes to separate fighters, but to connect 
them, in an asymmetric relationship of domination and exploitation”.  (Therborn (1978), pp219-220)  The 
State creates, to quote Horace, concordia discors (harmony in discord).  (Horace Epistles, I xii.19 as quoted 
in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (3
rd edn.) (Book Club Associates, London, 1979), p258) 
306 Poulantzas (1978), p127 (emphasis in original).  Stiglitz provides examples of such discord and harmony 
between the World Bank and IMF.  On the one hand, Stiglitz claims that during his time at the World Bank, 
“the IMF kept much of the negotiations and some of the agreements secret from World Bank members even 
in joint missions” and his “colleagues at the Bank frequently complained that even those participating in a 
mission had to go to the government of the country [involved,] who ‘leaked’ what was going on”.  On the 
other hand, the World Bank cooperated with the IMF in the 1980s by providing its ‘structural adjustment 
loans’ only when the IMF gave its approval.  (See Stiglitz (2002), pp51 and 14) 
307 Stewart (2008), p438.  This is a subtly, but importantly, different argument from that proposed by those 
‘state derivationists’ who “derive the necessity of the form of the state as a separate institution from the 
nature of the relations between capitals.  Starting from the fact that capital can exist only in the form of 
individual capitals, these authors... conclude that it is only due to the existence of an autonomised state 
standing above the fray that the social relations of an otherwise anarchic society are reproduced and the 
general interest of total social capital thus established”. (Holloway and Picciotto (1978), p19)  The problem 
with the ‘state derivationist’ position is that, “[i]n so far as the state is derived from the need to fulfil a 
function which cannot be fulfilled by private capital, the state’s ability to perform this function is already 
presupposed” (Holloway and Picciotto (1978), p21).  However, as Holloway and Picciotto rightly argue, “the 
contradictions of capitalist society [are] reproduced within the state apparatus, thus making it questionable 
whether the state can ever act adequately in the interests of capital in general [and] if state actions are not to 
be identified with the interests of capital in general, this breaks the logical link between the laws of motion of 80 
 
 
International law is an integral part of this state-function because it “damps down and 
channels [intra- and inter-class] political crises, in such a way that they do not lead to 
crises of the [global] State itself”.
308  It does this not only through developing, applying and 
enforcing  international  law,  however.    Through  applying  the  insights  gained  from  the 
earlier ‘unpacking of legality’ in the analysis of the legal form, it can be understood that: 
 
“[T]here  is  always  a  set  of  state  practices  and  techniques  that  escape  juridical 
systematization... This is not to say that they are ‘anomic’ or arbitrary... But the 
logic they obey… is somewhat distinct from the logic of the juridical order… each 
juridical system allows the Power-State to disregard its own laws and even enters 
an appropriate variable in the rules of the game that it organises...  which... entails 
both that legality is always compensated by illegalities ‘on the side’, and that state 
illegality is always inscribed in the legality which it institutes…  Lastly, of course, 
there are cases where the State engages in straightforward violations of its own law 
– violations which, while appearing as crude transgressions not covered by the law, 
are no less part of the structural functioning of the State.”
309 
 
However, although the global State is able to absorb and manage the resistance of popular 
masses  through  the  tactical  use  of  international  law,  the  equilibrium  reached  is 
permanently dynamic and unstable because “the resistance of the exploited classes is able 
to find means and occasions to express itself”.
310  It does so in the gaps and contradictions 
of the State which inevitably result from the fact that the State is the material condensation 
of complex and contradictory class relations.  This contradictory relationship between the 
global State the TCC is what Steven Spitzer’s ‘notion’ of State against Capital is intended 
to  capture.    On  the  one  hand,  “[t]he  ‘capitalist  state’  may  use  law  as  a  means  of 
‘disciplining’ specific capitals in the interest of capitalism as a whole, and [on the other,] 
power groups in capitalist societies may use the state and its laws against the interests of 
both specific capitals and capitalism in general”
311 while, unintentionally, strengthening 
and  legitimating  the  legal  order  by  articulating  their  demands  through  laws  and  legal 
institutions.  
   
                                                                                                                                                                                
capital and the content of state activity”.  (Holloway and Picciotto (1978), p25)  Poulantzas’ account does not 
encounter this problem for two reasons.  Firstly, it from the start incorporates an understanding of the 
contradictory nature of capitalist relations (and thus the capitalist state).  Secondly, it is not based on the 
impersonal and abstract ‘logic of capital’ (though it does not ignore it) but instead on the class struggle. 
308 Poulantzas (1978), p91 (emphasis in original) 
309 Ibid, pp84-85 (emphasis in original)  See also Miéville (2006), pp147-148 
310 Althusser (2008), p21 
311 Spitzer (1983), pp112-113  (emphasis added)  See also Knox’s discussion of the possibility of domestic 
political pressure from subordinated groups and classes affecting intergovernmental relations. (Knox (2009), 
pp427-428) 81 
 
Chapter 4 – ‘Filling the bottle’ 
 
So  far  this  thesis  has  found  the  form  of  international  law  in  international  legal 
relationships, introduced the concept of reification to account for how it is possible for 
these relationships to affect one another, turned to the concept of the apparatus for an 
explanation of the structure of the totality of legal relationships, and touched upon the 
function  of  the  international  legal  order  in  the  context  of  the  global  State.  
Form/relationship  and  structure/apparatus  are  not,  however,  the  only  aspects  of  the 
phenomenon of international law described by the concept of International  Law.  Any 
serious theoretical investigation must also account for its content. 
 
Although Pashukanis’ critical account of the legal form is useful because it is “corrective 
to the tendency to analyse legal content in isolation”,
312 if it is simplistically applied it risks 
producing a theory disinterested in, or even “inimical to, examinations of particular legal 
contents”.
313  To avoid this, it is vital not to treat the legal form as “an empty bottle into 
which any content can be poured”
314 as to do so “would be to conceptualise content and 
form as separate, isolated qualities of a social formation, and to fail to understand the 
dialectical interrelation between the two”.
315  While a focus on form can shed some light 
on this interrelation (insofar as that form is not infinitely plastic and cannot contain some 
particular contents),
316 it is not sufficient.  For this reason, this chapter seeks to analyse 
how the legal form is imbued with content: how  economic relations of production and 
exchange become inscribed in international legal rules, processes and decisions.  It will 
build upon the earlier discussions on the ‘base-superstructure metaphor’ in its analysis of 
the structural linkages between the networks of global economic and legal relations and, 
more importantly, will investigate the ways in which economic relationships gain material 
existence within the international law, mediated by its internal structure. 
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Economics and the legal order 
 
Recognising ‘tilt’ 
 
That economic relations of production and exchange do become inscribed in the content of 
the international legal order is clear, and may usefully be looked at through the lens of 
Wythe Holt’s concept of Tilt: 
 
“Tilt is a fancy and somewhat sanitized word for oppression, signifying that the 
bias and prejudice which everyone experiences every day is neither random nor 
fortuitous.  Few effects of tilt are clear and unambiguous; although some people 
derive a net benefit from tilt, most are burdened by it...  While usual, tilt is neither 
natural  nor  inevitable.    It  is  a  human  artefact  that,  like  all  human  artefacts,  is 
malleable and transformable...  While legal tilt is often obscure and, depending 
upon the purpose and perspective of one's inquiry, difficult to delineate, one can 
discover instances when tilt is apparent.”
317 
 
The example Holt chooses is one from the field of domestic law, the ‘labour conspiracy 
cases’ of the early to mid-nineteenth century.
318  In these, the judiciary consistently handed 
down decisions, the content of which was ‘transparently biased in favour of employers’, 
that ‘concerted economic activity by labour unions was per se a violation of the common 
law crime of conspiracy’ even though the ‘workers argued that it would be fundamentally 
unfair to deny them the power of acting jointly, as employers might freely combine against 
them and as the strength of capital lay in its cumulative, collective nature’.  Despite its age 
and domestic focus, this is still an important example: in an age of globalised productive 
processes with global classes, this same pattern is repeated across the globe.  For example, 
in  the  EPZs  Klein  describes,  but  also  more  generally,  union  activity  and  even  unions 
themselves are still often illegal: 
 
“In some Central American and Asian EPZs, strikes are officially illegal; in Sri 
Lanka, it is illegal to do anything at all that might jeopardise the country’s export 
earnings, including publishing and distributing critical material.”
319 
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The same story is repeated in the historical development and present functioning of anti-
terror or ‘security’ legislation and adjudication, as investigated by Mark Neocleous in his 
book Critique of Security.
320  Neocleous’ analysis reveals a shift in the phenomenon and 
concept of ‘martial law’ – “from regulation of the military within the state to regulation by 
the  military  of  the  whole  social  order  on  behalf  of  the  state”
321 –  followed  by  a 
reconceptualisation of martial law in terms of ‘emergency powers’ in order to both soften 
and  entrench  (through  legislative  rather  than  simply  executive  action)  the  exercise  of 
martial law powers to ‘police’ ‘disorder’ in times of relative peace.  Although ostensibly 
framed as being necessary to deal with (para)military violence, “it was war of a rather 
different kind – the class war – within the more general regulation of capitalist modernity 
for which the emergency powers were exercised”.
322  As part of the same movement, the 
‘stick’  of  (national)  security  was  complemented  by  the  ‘carrot’  of  social  security 
(developed to dampen class conflict through the alleviation of the extremes of economic 
inequality and taking the form of international aid, development grants and loans, etc. at 
the international level) under the broader concept of Economic Security and, as Neocleous 
points  out,  “both  domestically  and  internationally,  ‘economic  security’  is  coda  for 
capitalist order”.
323  The clearest articulation of this can be seen in the policies of the TCC 
(through the states and international institutions controlled by its various factions) when 
faced with actually-existing communism: 
 
“The key institutions of ‘international order’ in this period [(the IMF and GATT of 
1947, the Brussels Pact of 1948, etc.)] invoked a particular vision of order with a 
view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing ‘security’ – political, social 
and economic – from the communist threat...  The issue was communism as a threat 
to private property and thus to the vision of an ‘economic order’ of the ‘civilised 
West’; that is, communism as an alternative socio-economic order, not the Soviet 
Union as a military threat.”
324 
 
Whether dealing with  public or private law, domestic or international  law, Neocleous’ 
argument supports Holt’s claims that: 
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“[T]he types  of decisions  in  which we  easily  find  tilt are not  randomly  spread 
across the spectrum, but are concentrated in areas in which working people directly 
confront  bosses  and  the  propertied.    The  effect  of  tilt  in  these  decisions  is  to 
discipline the work force, to emphasize and reinforce the power of owners and 
managers  over  workers.    Tilt  therefore  has  a  coherence  that  demands 
investigation.”
325 
 
Explaining ‘tilt’: beyond instrumentalism 
 
The  intrinsic  connection,  briefly  sketched  out  above,  which  exists  between  economic 
conflict and the content and functioning of the legal order risks leading the theorist towards 
‘instrumentalist Marxism’ in which the “legal system [is] seen as [an instrument] which 
can  be  manipulated,  almost  at  will,  by  the  capitalist  class  as  a  whole  or,  in  certain 
moments,  by  particular  fractions  of  capital”.
326   Although  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
instrumentalism “has occupied a significant status in the intellectual history of Marxism... 
to portray it as representative of even a majority of Marxist theorists today is, however, a 
flagrant reductio ad absurdum of Marxist theory”.
327  Firstly, as Macherey argues: 
 
“The [capitalist class] certainly makes decisions, but, as we know, [their] decisions 
are  determined…  the  story  follows  a  necessary  path  –  not,  as  Poe  would  say, 
because everything derives from a final intention, but because it is the reading of a 
previously established model.”
328 
 
Secondly, as many Marxists have recognised, at both national and international levels, the 
economic power of the capitalist class does not, and cannot, always be directly translated 
into favourable legislative, contractual or judicial/arbitral  decisions.   As Mark Tushnet 
argues, “we all know that judges are formally independent of class pressures, that they only 
occasionally say that they are acting to promote class interests, and that their social ties to 
the ruling class are loose enough to make it implausible that the judges are instruments of 
the ruling class”.
329  Furthermore, as E.P. Thompson argues in discussing the Whigs of the 
18
th Century, even where the capitalist/ruling class is able to make, interpret or violate laws 
to their advantage, this does not mean that the legal apparatus is “a pliant medium to be 
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twisted this way and that”.
330  This is because “if the law is evidently partial and unjust 
then  it  will  mask  nothing,  legitimise  nothing,  contribute  nothing  to  any  class’s 
hegemony”.
331  In an effort to appear just, the capitalist class are thus, at least sometimes, 
rendered  “prisoners  of  their  own  rhetoric”
332 and  forced  into  “actually  being  just”.
333  
Indeed, individual capitalists may believe their own rhetoric and yet act, unknowingly, in 
such a way as to reproduce their own class hegemony: 
 
“Law is the opium of both the masses and the ruling class.  The fact that the ruling 
class has a more strategic position and a greater interest in the manufacture of this 
opium in no way exempts them from all its addictive effects.”
334 
 
This is a particular problem for instrumentalist accounts, which rely upon the capitalist 
class and legal professionals having a conscious awareness of class interests to be able to 
have these enacted into law: although this may sometimes be what happens, as both Hugh 
Collins and Mark Tushnet argue, “lawmakers may not always, perhaps never, know what 
constitutes the long-term interests of the ruling class”.
335  Indeed, instrumentalist accounts 
are faced with the problem of explaining either “how motivations inevitably coincide with 
a person's objective class position, or… how [a] social class... comes to share a common 
perception of interests”
336 if it is not inevitable.  Whichever explanation is favoured, the 
problem remains that “the whole enterprise of ensuring coherence and consistency in legal 
reasoning has  to  be dismissed as  false consciousness, perpetuated by lawyers who are 
concerned to mystify their desire to support the interests of the ruling class”.
337 
 
Explaining ‘tilt’: towards ‘relative autonomy’ 
 
An important insight into the difficulties faced by the instrumentalist approach is offered 
by Isaac Balbus, who argues that it provides not only the wrong solution but addresses the 
wrong question: the ‘autonomy’ of the international legal order from the global economy 
which  would  be  claimed  by  many  orthodox  theorists  and  denied  by  instrumentalist 
Marxists  is  a  feature  of  the  extent  to  which  that  order  “functions  and  develops 
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independently of the will of extralegal social actors”
338 such as transnational corporations 
or  financial  institutions  like  the  IMF,  World  Bank  and  WTO.    This,  however,  leaves 
entirely unquestioned the extent to which that order is or is not autonomous of the global 
capitalist economic system of which those corporations and institutions are part. 
 
Although the questions are distinct, the answer to each, to an extent, is dependent on the 
answer to the other.  If the instrumentalist claim was an accurate reflection of observed 
reality, and international law has no autonomy from the capitalist class, then this would 
necessarily entail the conclusion that it has no autonomy from the capitalist system either.  
However, as argued above, instrumentalism is highly problematic because international 
law is not only, or even typically, used instrumentally.  Similarly, if the orthodox claim 
was an accurate reflection of observed reality, and international law is wholly autonomous 
from the capitalist class, then this would necessarily entail the conclusion that it is wholly 
autonomous from the capitalist system insofar as that system is, essentially, a system of 
classes and class relations.  However, as also argued above, international law is sometimes 
used instrumentally and does operate to benefit a particular class, which means that it 
cannot be wholly autonomous in either sense.  The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that 
international law is relatively autonomous in both senses.  As Alistair Stewart argues: 
 
“There are… two kinds of relative autonomy; autonomy from the structures and 
autonomy from classes. However, these do not come into contradiction...  the first 
explains  the  relative  autonomy  that  exists  [in  general]  whereas  the  second  in 
combination  with  the first  gives the  relative  autonomy within a concrete social 
formation.”
 339  
 
As Beirne explains, this entails that: 
 
“...in its basic struggle with the working class, the capitalist class cannot manipulate 
[international  law]  at  will...    [it  is]  subject  to  the  functional  constraints  of  the 
structural  ensemble  of  social  relationships  under  capitalism...    [which]  may, 
simultaneously, be internal to [its institutions] – in the force of its belief systems, 
recruitment patterns and organisational stability confronted by the fluid contours of 
the class struggle(s) – and external.”
340 
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Economics in the legal order 
 
Breaking up the ‘law block’ 
 
Balbus’ reproblematisation of the autonomy question is insightful, but his solution is a 
return to a Pashukanite argument of an essential homology of the commodity and legal 
forms  which,  although  “valuable  in  demystifying  the  law  as  an  ideological  form  in 
capitalist societies... has also created a cul-de-sac for Marxist attempts to come to grips 
with  law”.
341    Alan  Stone  makes  the  important  critical  point  that,  because  of  the 
generalities  of  its  underlying  propositions,  it  cannot  be  expected  to  “yield  specific 
predictions about such mundane things as the content of specific legal rules or whether, 
where, or when specific laws will be enacted”.
342  Indeed, as Tushnet argues, it faces two 
problems in any attempt to account for the content of international law.  In it, “[b]ourgeois 
legal systems are described as sets of general, abstract rules of universal application...  [yet, 
in] contemporary capitalism, ‘the overwhelming characteristic of the regulations seems to 
be [an] attention to minute detail rather than abstract principle’.”
343  Furthermore, it cannot 
account for what is demonstrated by legal realist analyses: 
 
“[There are always] rules and counterrules, rules with exceptions of such scope as 
to threaten the rule itself...  it is ‘often... impossible’ to link a legal rule [directly] to 
‘any  aspect  of  the  relations  of  production’  [and]  some  laws  are  ‘deliberate 
attempt[s] to change... minor aspect[s] of the relations of production’ and therefore 
cannot reflect them”.
344 
 
Understanding  legal  content-production,  therefore,  “requires  us  not  only  to  grasp  the 
historical meaning of international law as a semantic order of reification (in the Lukácsian 
sense of the word), but also to identify the exact internal structure by which the constituent 
reificatory acts behind it operate”.
345 
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Essential legal relations, derivative subrelations and particular legal rules 
 
Stone offers a solution through what he calls “the distinction between law in general and 
the fundamentals of the legal order”,
346 of which the latter are to be found particularly in 
the private law areas of property and contract.  He refers us to two apparently contradictory 
arguments made by Marx in the 1859 preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy: firstly that the relations of production are the economic structure on which the 
legal and political superstructures rest, and secondly, that speaking of ‘property relations’, 
in place of ‘relations of production’, “merely expresses the same thing in legal terms”
347 
(about  which  Richard  Kinsey  rightly  recognises  that  “[t]he  implication  is  clear:  any 
separation of the legal expression and the social-economic relation is wholly artificial”).
348  
What Stone adds to the analysis above, is a reconciliation of this separation and synonymy 
– by utilising the distinction Engels makes between ‘essential legal relations’ and particular 
laws/judicial  practice
349 and  introducing  a  third  category  of  ‘derivative  subrelations’  – 
which allows us to “distinguish laws that are central to a legal system from laws that could 
be changed tomorrow without affecting the character of the legal system (or economic 
system, one may add)”
350. 
 
The essential legal relations which can be derived directly from the economy (that property 
shall be private property, that parties to treaties shall be formally equal, etc.) do not touch 
upon concrete  and specific legal  rules  (such as the different  limits  there have been  at 
different  times  to  the  ‘territorial  sea’)  except  through  hierarchies  of  legal  concepts
351 
which, the further they get from the economy, are governed more and more by the internal 
structuring logic of the legal apparatus. 
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According  to  Stone  the  hierarchic  relations  amongst  these  categories  “move  along  the 
following path: 
 
structure 
↓ 
essential legal relations 
↓ 
derivative subrelations 
↓ 
particular rules”
352 
 
This  allows for an account  which does not  reduce individual legal  decision-makers to 
capitalist conspirators or automatons because, “[s]o long as the essential legal relations are 
taken as the starting point, those actors who create the derivative subrelations and the 
particular  legal  rules  under  them  will  develop  a  jurisprudence  compatible  with  the 
structurally  defined  system”
353 even  when  individual  laws  or  legal  decisions  do  not 
develop in the way an instrumental Marxist might expect.  This is a particularly important 
insight because while the international political order “has in practice meant domination by 
an  elite,  the  ideology  it  produced  has  taken  on  the  appearance  of  neutrality...    [and 
international]  decision  making  that  is  dispassionate,  impersonal,  disinterested,  and 
precedential, is [widely] considered desirable and descriptive”.
354 
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353 Stone (1985), pp58-59 
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Pashukanite alternative.  For example, as Stone argues, “[d]espite an extended discussion of the forms of 
capitalist legality, Pashukanis does not show how judges, formally independent of class pressures, act to 
promote capitalist interests”.  (Stone (1985), p46) 90 
 
The primary and foundational relationship for the legal order is the formal equality of legal 
subjects, which is (as Pashukanis explains and as is discussed, above) derived directly from 
the same feature of economic subjects in the commodity-exchange relation, and which has 
its existence in international law in the formal juridical equality of sovereign states.  As the 
legal order does more than merely reflect the form and functioning of the economy but is 
implicated  in  its  (re)production,  this  legal  equivalency  could  not  be  otherwise  without 
affecting the character of the legal system or indeed the economic system.  This formal 
equivalency inherent within the capitalist legal form serves as a condition for the more 
particular legal rules and institutions which are based on it.  From states’ formal equality 
flows their purported equal ability to create law through custom and treaty, and thus to 
contribute to the setting up of international institutions such as the IMF, WTO and World 
Bank, and imbue these with arbitrative and enforcement functions.  From this spring the 
particular,  actually-existing  institutions,  their  procedures  for  creating  legal  rules  and 
decisions binding on their members, and those rules and decisions themselves (such as the 
rule that the WTO dispute settlement system “cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations” set out in the WTO Agreement
355 or the decision that the OECD countries 
“ha[ve] the legal right to modify not only their inter se legal relations, but the rights and 
obligations of the totality of the WTO membership”).
356 
 
Even the most detailed and nuanced analysis of the global economy cannot explain the 
particular rules governing a particular international tribunal, and it is not necessary for the 
functioning of the global capitalist economy that each individual rule of international 
institutions bolster this functioning so long as essential legal relations are taken as the 
starting point, which holds true without the need to theorise a coherent capitalist agenda on 
the part of the institutions and the states which act in and through them. 
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Mapping the (essential legal structure of the) global legal order 
 
Now that we have Stone’s topography, the next task is to attempt to map the global legal 
order onto it and ask ‘what, then, is the essential legal structure of international law?’  As 
discussed above (following the analysis of both the ‘state derivationists’ and Poulantzasian 
structuralism)  it  can  be  said  that  structure  is  intimately  tied  to  function:  just  as  the 
apparatus-structure of the global state is tied to its functioning, the internal structure of the 
legal  order  is  tied  to  its  functioning  (and  both  these  functions  are  interdependent  and 
inseparable).    Together,  they  organise,  by  creating  an  ‘unstable  equilibrium  of 
compromise’,  disparate  and  often  conflicting  TCC  fractions  into  a  ‘power  bloc’  while 
strategically disorganising the TWC through the tactical use of both concessions and open 
struggle.   
 
The key thing here is that this mediatory (dis)organisation dampens and channels the crises 
of capitalism.  This is important because, as Hillel Ticktin argues, “the concepts of decline 
and  crisis  are  integral  to  a  Marxist  conception  of  capitalism”
357 and,  thus,  the  global 
capitalist legal order: the (class) contradictions described above are inevitably inscribed in 
the global State and thus the global capitalist order is necessarily unstable, contradictory 
and  prone  to  crises.  Each  crisis  is  not  the same, however,  and  engenders a different 
solution  with  a  different  set  of  essential  legal  relations  and  particular  rules.    Ticktin 
provides an account of the changing (global state-)political structure to which the changing 
legal relations correspond: 
 
“[W]hen  the  contradictions  could  no  longer  be  contained  in  the  spontaneous 
movement  of  capital  accumulation,  alternatives  were  needed  to  stabilise  the 
system...  Historically, capital has employed five solutions.  The first was the turn 
to finance capital, so absorbing the surplus capital.  This was combined with the 
second and third solutions: imperialism and war, with World War One being the 
ultimate result.  In the post-World War Two period, war became permanent through 
the Cold War and the many smaller hot wars that took place.  This was linked to 
concessions to the working class in the form of the welfare state, which was the 
fourth  mediation,  which  prevented  the  poles  of  the  contradictions  from  pulling 
apart.”
358 
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Although “[this] series of mediating forms have stabilised capitalism in the period up to the 
present day... those forms have now been so weakened that the present crisis has broken 
out”,
359 bringing  with  it  a  fifth  mediation  –  an  unstable  combination  of  New  Finance 
Capital and the War on Terror. 
 
As  Ticktin  explains  in  more  detail,  it  was  Lenin  who  “provided  a  mechanism  of 
understanding the need for imperialism, arguing that monopoly led to finance capital and 
so  the  export  of  capital  and  hence  imperialism”.
360   However,  imperialism’s  role  in 
stabilising capital was itself unstable, and “led to a world war and revolutions, followed by 
a  world  depression”.
361   Stalinism  and  the  Cold  War  followed  and  provided  a  dual-
stabilisation.    On  the  one  hand,  Stalinism  “attracted  the  cream  of  the  would  be 
revolutionaries  and  neutralised  them...  by  directing  them  into  futile  or  meaningless 
ventures... by so debasing Marxism that it ceased to be a revolutionary doctrine”
362 and by 
turning radical movements into bureaucratic entities.  On the other, “the horrific example 
of  the  Soviet  Union  itself,  [with  its]  show  trials  and  millions  purged  in  the  name  of 
Marxism  [meant  that]...    the  ruling  class  in  the  West  could  mount  a  Cold  War  with 
apparent justification, even though there was never any real [military] threat”.
363 
 
This (imagined) “threat of total global war, spiced up with real wars, allowed the massive 
diversion  of  resources  into  the  military  sector,  which,  in  principle,  could  never  be 
satisfied”
364 as  it  is  governed  not  by  value  but  by  necessity.    Together  with  war  the 
capitalist classes, “accepted the need to introduce a welfare state in order to avoid more 
radical demands.... [and] married the warfare state with the welfare state...  The economy 
was  controlled  or  organised  so  that  it  avoided  both  underconsumption  and 
disproportionality between economic sectors.  With the working-class controlled, the rate 
of profit could be maintained.  As a form of capitalist stabilisation it was and remains 
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unsurpassable.”
365  And yet, as the Cold War came to an end as Stalinism waned, the TCC 
(re)turned to (New) Finance Capital as a mode of control.  Ticktin’s conclusion is clear: 
 
“Looked at from the perspective of a declining capitalism we are looking at an 
attempt by the  capitalist  class to  maintain its  dominance in  the face of serious 
challenges.  First it goes for ‘planning’ the economy, which is seen as conflicting 
with private enterprise, and then it returns to the parasitic form of finance capital, 
leading to de-industrialisation, polarisation of incomes, downturns and the threat of 
serious depressions.  Both solutions constitute direct threats to capital itself.  The 
first was always seen as squeezing out capital from the economy but accepted as 
the least worst alternative in the circumstances.  The second, that of finance capital, 
was embraced by the capitalist class knowing all the risks.”
366 
 
In light  of Ticktin’s  account  it can be understood why, for example,  the property-law 
doctrine of terra nullius and the distinction between the rights and duties of ‘civilised’ and 
‘uncivilised’ peoples in the making and application of treaties which were so important for 
the colonialist-imperialist solution have no place in the contemporary solution of New 
Finance Capital even though, both as concepts and phenomena, Property and Contract are 
fundamental to both.  Similarly, the harmonisation of standards, symmetrical elimination 
of barriers to trade and coercion towards privatisation which characterise the contemporary 
order as created/promoted by the WTO, IMF and World Bank would have hindered rather 
than helped the earlier forms of warfare state solution with its reliance on protectionism, 
hierarchical trade flows and nationalised industry. 
 
Dividing up the legal field 
 
The analysis of the legal order in chapter two, above, led to a rejection of the term ‘Law’ in 
favour of a more nuanced separation of its constitutive elements, and an acceptance that, as 
Duncan Kennedy argues, a certain “set of legal conceptions, though no particular set of 
legal institutions, is part of the definition of the commodity mode of production”.
367  Those 
legal conceptions, as Richard Kinsey recognised, “circumscribe and define the available 
means and forces of production so that, although at one level ‘ideal’, laws must be counted 
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amongst  the  concrete  conditions  of  social  existence.”
368   On  the  other  hand,  Kennedy 
makes the legitimate point that there is an apparent tension between this argument and the 
Marxist commitment to materialism because “legal concepts are anything but material.  
Indeed,  the  belief  in  the  formative  power  of  legal  concepts  is  often  ridiculed  as  an 
archetypical form of idealism”.
369  Kennedy is correct in rejecting a view of Marx as a 
simplistic economic determinist, but this does not, as Kennedy appears to believe, mean 
that the view of Marxism as materialist must also be rejected.   
 
Rasulov offers a solution to (or, rather, elimination of) ‘that infamous problem of law as a 
constitutive  factor’
370 which  Kennedy  raises  in  his  ‘critique’  of  Marxian  materialism, 
above.  For Rasulov, the ‘sense of circularity’ at the heart of the problem ultimately derives 
from a ‘lack of conceptual precision’ which leads to the inability to distinguish between 
two radically different phenomena: 
 
“It is  only if we understand ‘law’ in  its  Ehrlichian sense [the ‘living  law’, the 
actually-observed ‘customary’ law-in-action] that it will have to be recognized, as 
Tushnet insists, as ontologically constitutive vis-à-vis the economic base.  Taken in 
the more traditional formalist-positivist sense [as the formally posited system of 
legislative ordinances], ‘law’ remains, just as the classical Marxist tradition has 
always insisted, a completely superstructural phenomenon.”
371 
 
To avoid Kennedy’s conclusion, therefore, it is necessary to make explicit the argument 
that from a rigorous Marxist point of view not all ‘law’ exists on the same ontological 
plane.  However, this is not only true in the sense captured by Stone’s distinction amongst 
‘essential relations’, ‘derivative subrelations’ and ‘particular rules’ within a particular field 
of law such as contract, but also more fundamentally than that, in the sense of distinctions 
amongst whole fields of ‘law’.  When the accounts being analysed talk of ‘Law’ being an 
integral part of the economic base (as it is), they are almost all (correctly) only talking 
about  the  ‘law  of  property’  and  ‘law  of  contract’,  and  not  other  fields  such  as 
‘(international) criminal law’, ‘(international) humanitarian law’, or ‘the law on diplomatic 
relations’. 
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Indeed, in addition to his vertical-hierarchic typology of legal concepts and norms, Stone 
recognises just this  sort of horizontal-spread typology.   Imported from the writings of 
Jürgen Habermas, it divides laws into “(1) those that constitute the mode of production 
(e.g., property, contract) and promote the economy; (2) those that complement the market 
by adapting the legal system to new business arrangements (e.g., much commercial law); 
(3) those that replace market activities (e.g., public utility law and occupational licensure); 
and (4) those that respond to politically effective reactions to economic dysfunction (e.g., 
minimum wage or environmental laws)”.
372  This sort of division is both more accurate and 
more useful than treating ‘the Law’ as a unified and unitary whole, and complements his 
own earlier distinction.  For Stone, “the idea of essential legal relations... refers to the legal 
expressions or images of the central components of the capitalist economic structure”,
373 
which  are  contract  and  (private)  property  (described  by  Stone  as  the  “distinguishing 
feature[s] of capitalism that cannot thrive without law”).
374 
 
(Re)introducing realism 
 
In addition to his critique of Marxist materialism, Kennedy argues that “Marx conceived of 
the legal structure of the commodity mode of production as a coherent whole, with detailed 
subrules flowing rationally from the first principles (the whole modified in an episodic and 
superficial way by specific legislative interventions)”
375 and thus believed that the legal 
structure could just be taken ‘as a given’ in analysing economic change.  As a result, 
Kennedy argues, “Marx missed the crucial realist/institutionalist insight: there are many 
different  regimes  of  specific  legal  subrules  that  are  consistent  with  the  indeterminate 
general  notions  of  property  and  free  contract.    The  law  of  value,  the  pricing  of 
commodities according to labour inputs, will work differently according to which one of 
the alternatives the lawmakers select”.
376  For this reason, as Spitzer highlights, “it has 
become obvious that legal change does not correspond neatly to the life course of any 
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given mode of production; nor do specific legal arrangements necessarily stay within the 
boundaries of the mode of production in which they are expected to appear”.
377 
 
Nevertheless, the core realist insight is capable of being incorporated within the Marxian 
analytic:  what  is  implicit  in  Stone’s  model  –  that  rules  and  subrelations  may  differ 
between different (domestic) legal apparatuses, or evolve within a particular apparatus, so 
long as they do not contradict the essential legal relations of private property and ‘free’ 
contract – is explicitly recognised by Kinsey: 
 
“The  specific  content  of  laws  will  vary  as  Engels  correctly  realised...    What 
however is invariable and necessary to the capitalist mode of production is that the 
juridical relation is expressed through abstract and general norms – such as those of 
the laws of contract and private property – which in turn are premised upon the 
juridical relation being established as a concrete practice.”
378 
 
For  an  explanation  for  the  continuity  of  the  essential  relations  we  may  turn  to  the 
relationship  between  the  legal  and  commodity  forms:  for  an  explanation  for  the 
discontinuity of the particular rules, we must turn to the concrete specificity (in time and 
place) of particular social formations.  Although some of Kennedy’s critique of Marx(ism) 
is misplaced, he is correct to claim that “[b]reaking up the ‘law block’, by recognising the 
internal incoherence of legal doctrine, and the contingent constitutive role of law makers at 
all levels, eliminates an obstacle to understanding what happens when oppressed groups 
gain concessions through the legal system”
379 because it reproblematises the idea that there 
is  a monolithic ‘inner logic of  capitalist  law’ to which concessions  must  be somehow 
opposed (which mirrors Miéville’s reproblematisation of the legal-illegal distinction). 
 
Kennedy follows on from  his  criticism of Marx for ignoring the  field  of potential for 
particular rules to change, and change their effect, within the framework of the general 
principles  of  capitalist  law  by  arguing  that  “[t]he  legal  component  of  the  mode  of 
production is, in so much as it actually functions in the world, the collection of particular 
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379 Kennedy (1985), p996.  As Tushnet argues, “[r]eforms are extracted from unwilling segments of the 
ruling class by pressure from the working class, enhanced by those leading segments of the bourgeoisie that 
understand how reform may preserve capitalism.  Conversely, repressive laws are imposed by the ruling class 
on a working class too weak to resist.”  (Tushnet (1982), p287)  What Kennedy’s analysis adds to this is the 
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rules, not the general principles”.
380  As Kennedy realises, this would be neither interesting 
nor important “if we could say that the principles, while not coming directly to bear on the 
cases, come to bear indirectly...  [Instead,] the whole point of recognising the element of 
subjectivity, of nonclosure in the legal system according to its own criteria, is that we 
sometimes can’t identify, in the new cases, which decision actually enforces the norms of 
property  and  contract”.
381   This  argument  can  be  condensed  to  the  maxim:  “general 
propositions don’t decide concrete cases”.
382  The alternative, as argued by Tushnet, is that:  
 
“There are results in particular cases, which the judges rationalize by invoking or 
creating a rule.  But there are always alternative rules that could have been invoked 
to yield a different result, and alternative rationalizations of the same result that 
invoke still other rules...  indeterminacy of any significant degree will doom the 
comprehensive project.  Not only will it be clear that the result could have been 
different, so that the link between the rule invoked and the material base will be 
entirely adventitious, but the rule itself could have been different, so that the link 
that  is  supposed  to  explain  things  would  have  to  be  reconstructed  entirely  ad 
hoc.”
383 
 
This is correct, but not quite in the way Kennedy or Tushnet suppose. 
 
Structuring the fractured ontology of ‘the law (block)’ 
 
Structures within structures 
 
There are gaps, contradictions and other instances of ‘nonclosure’ in the structures outlined 
above.
384  However, this does not mean that, in these various open spaces and moments, an 
account  of  the  global  legal  order  must  revert  either  to  subjectivist  voluntarism  and 
                                                           
380 Kennedy (1985), p998 
381 Kennedy (1985), pp998-999.  This lack of clarity is at least in part caused by the fact that “[t]he legal 
realists have taught us that ‘property’ is an extraordinarily vague term.  The concept itself gives no clues as to 
what kinds of things can be ‘objects’ of ownership, nor as to the particular rights, powers, privileges, and 
immunities that go along with ownership.  ‘Property’ is a catch all for an infinitely varied set of ‘bundles of 
rights’...  ‘Contract’ is no more clear cut.  The enforcement of a contract against the will of one of the parties 
is, like any other lawsuit, an instance of unfreedom or coercion.  The exact kind and extent of state coercion 
that should occur in connection with private agreements cannot be deducted from the idea of contract itself”. 
(Kennedy (1985), p951) 
382 Holmes, J. (dissenting) in Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), p76 
383 Tushnet (1982), pp288-289 
384 It must be remembered of course that “[w]hen new cases arise, legal practitioners deal with them through 
the techniques of interpreting precedent and interpreting first principles [and s]ometimes everyone agrees 
that a particular outcome is ‘legally correct’.  The system [in such cases] has enough closure so that it is 
proper to speak of a different outcome, under the circumstances, as a ‘legal mistake’, or as evidence of bad 
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individualistic  theories  of  ‘rational  choice’  or  to  Miéville’s  claim  that  ‘between  equal 
rights, force decides’ (such force being the extra-legal force recognised by Arthur, above) 
in order to explain the actions of decision-makers: there is always another structure behind 
the one initially being analysed which either fills in the gaps in the dominant structure or 
becomes dominant during the moment of ‘nonclosure’. 
 
Primarily, the underlying structure is the ideological structure discussed in chapter two, 
above.  Indeed, the ideological structure to an extent functions best in and because of the 
gaps  in  the  formal  structure  of  the  international  legal  order  which  hide  the  intimate 
connection between international law and global capitalism.  As Macherey argues: 
 
“It must always seem that a new story with a different ending is possible.  The 
narrative gives the impression of novelty in so far as it is a new story at every 
moment:  other  words  might  have  been  spoken,  things  might  have  happened 
differently...    Constraint  simultaneously  implies  a  certain  transparency:  the 
narrative compels precisely because it seems that it might have been different.  But 
this transparency owes its existence and its power to the fact that it is combined 
with a certain opacity: one is not reading all possible narratives, but this particular 
materialisation,  this  specific  writing.    There  is  only  one  narrative:  each  of  its 
moments is ‘surprising’, ‘free’, but also definitive.”
385 
 
What Macherey shows as true of the novel is also true of the treaty text, tribunal decision, 
doctrinal  statement  or  textbook  chapter.    While  the  sense  of  indeterminacy  Kennedy 
inherits from the realists is a useful counterpoint to some of the mechanistic tendencies 
within Marxian scholarship, he overstates his case.  Even in the most open moment of 
international legal decision-making the outcome is more predictable than it may appear.  
However,  in  order  to  predict  the  moments  of  (re)closure  it  must  be  remembered  that 
neither the legal nor the ideological structures are in any sense automatic structures.  Just 
like  the  institutions  through  which  they  gain  their  material  shape,  they  are  embodied, 
primarily,  in  individuals,  in  their  personnel.    To  speak  of  international  legal  decision-
making is to speak of international legal decision-makers as part of the international legal 
profession.    
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The (international) legal profession 
 
Kennedy argues, ostensibly contra Marx, that: 
 
“Over  and  over  again,  historical  actors,  particular  men  and  women,  decide  the 
content of the background regime of legal rules without determining guidance from 
the internal criteria of the legal system.  They act with a measure of existential 
freedom [and]...  [i]n this specific sense, law reduces to the subjectivity of the law 
makers.”
386 
 
However,  as  Kennedy  himself  recognises,  “[t]here  is  nothing  abstract  about  this 
subjectivity, nor is it in any sense unconditioned.  It is always in relation to a situation that 
is experienced as given.  It does not transcend history”.
387  This is why (even though 
“[w]hat makes the state in capitalist society a capitalist state is not the class composition of 
the personnel of the state apparatus but the position occupied by the state in the capitalist 
mode  of  production”)
388 it  is  both  possible  and  vital  for  Marxian  international  law 
scholarship  to  develop  “a  general  class-theoretic  account  of  the  international  law 
profession”
389 and its place in the (re)production of the existing global capitalist social 
formulation which incorporates both ‘closure’ and ‘nonclosure’.  Marxian analysis can 
weather Kennedy’s critique, but only by taking it seriously and analysing why decision-
makers decide as they do. 
 
Although Marx’s own analysis predated the growth of the professions, so “he could not 
fully have foreseen the critical role that professional training and skill acquisition would 
play in modern capitalist development”,
390 domestic Marxian legal scholarship has not 
been slow to develop this critique (with perhaps one of the most cited examples being 
Ralph Miliband’s account).
391  Unfortunately, many accounts (including Miliband’s own) 
treat  legislators  and  judges  as  either  active  conspirators  with  capitalists  or  passive 
automatons  unconsciously  carrying  out  the  will  of  capital.    This  is  problematic  –  not 
because the class location of individuals in key nodal positions in institutions is irrelevant 
                                                           
386 Kennedy (1985), pp996-997 
387 Ibid, p997 (emphasis added) 
388 Holloway and Picciotto (1978), p5 
389 Rasulov (2008a), p279 
390 Hagan, J. et al “Class Structure and Legal Practice: Inequality and Mobility among Toronto Lawyers” 
Law & Society Review Vol.22, No.1 (1988), pp9-10.  The importance is summed up by Schlag in his 
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training.”  (Schlag (1998), p126) 
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or  exaggerated,  but  because  it  is  simply  the  surface  expression  of  a  deeper  and  more 
persistent structure which would continue to overdetermine legal outcomes even if the 
membership of the international legal profession were to change drastically.  Even more 
problematic, however, is that international legal scholarship has traditionally lacked even 
attempts to analyse the profession in terms of class, a blindness which  “serves to occlude 
our sight of the long-term historical processes that structure the field of global economic 
production and determine the general range of the corresponding juridical forms in terms 
of which this field is organized and the system of institutional regimes and processes by 
which its exploitative dynamics is maintained”.
392 
 
This is particularly apposite in the field of international humanitarian law (IHL), critiqued 
by  David  Kennedy  in  his  book  The  Dark  Sides  of  Virtue:  Reassessing  International 
Humanitarianism.
393  As Kennedy argues, IHL promises “a legal vocabulary for achieving 
justice outside the clash of [global] politics”
394 and as such, even though human rights 
(violations)  have  often  been  as  much  a  focal  point,  rallying  cry  and  cause  of  class 
antagonism between the TWC and TCC, it also demobilises and alienates the TWC by 
offering  “the  confidence  that  these  matters  are  being  professionally  dealt  with”
395   by 
others.  To the extent that the professional and political elites involved in determinations of 
right can claim to be disconnected from economic actors, they can, despite their own class 
backgrounds, present themselves as ‘independent’ and ‘benevolent’.  However, against the 
background  of  the  role  of  the  international  legal  order  in  the  (re)production  global 
capitalist economic relations, it becomes necessary to consider Schlag’s claim that if we 
reject the legal profession’s presentation of itself, “what remains is an assortment of legal 
actors, judges, and lawyers who practice ritualised forms of violence on each other and on 
other people... killing, plunder, extortion, and so on.  As for legal academics, they are 
demoted to the status of thug-trainers”
396 in their role as teachers of international law(yers). 
 
The value of introducing class analysis is that it allows us “to uncover the ideological 
biases of what Myres McDougal called the community of authoritative decision-makers...  
[and]  the  various  mechanisms  of  political  co-optation  of  international  civil  servants, 
foreign office diplomats, international law publishing houses, and even international law 
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textbook-writers”.
397  Although this aspect of the radical international law project requires 
empirical and conceptual investigation beyond the scope of this thesis, Rasulov’s argument 
in particular contains an important insight for the current analysis which it is worthwhile to 
highlight.  Legal professionals and orthodox scholars and professionals appear to share the 
view that “[a] man merely learned in the law is not a lawyer, and reading will hardly make 
him one”,
398 a “conception of the legal world, in which [for example] academics are not a 
part of the legal order, but are merely commentators on the work of those who are part of 
it”.
399 
 
However, the group of people whose daily practices have an impact on the functioning of 
international law is far wider than this: simply to accept that the profession is limited to 
those who self-identify as members of it is inherently idealist and subjective.  Instead, the 
‘international  legal  profession’  should  be  understood  to  include  all  those  who  have  a 
functional affect on the legal apparatus and, as a corollary, it should be recognised that any 
particular  individual  may  (according  to  this  functional  analysis)  simultaneously  be  a 
member of a different profession in another apparatus.  On this wider reading, its members 
– rather than being simply situated within the TMC – “occupy a variety of class positions... 
[and] the legal profession is in this sense integrated into the surrounding community and 
society”
400 rather than having a distinct class position as a profession.  The ‘existential 
freedom’  Kennedy  attributes  to  legal  decision-makers,  therefore,  is  in  reality  no  less 
determined than the ‘freedom’ of the economic actor acting within the framework of the 
logic of capital and the class struggle.   
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
Towards a systematic, coherent and radical theory 
 
The project 
 
This thesis has examined a number of accounts of law – national, international and 
transnational – provided by orthodox theorists as well as theorists working within the 
tradition of the critical left.  The aim has been to ‘separate the wheat from the chaff’ – to 
reveal and analyse the aspects of these accounts which can be used to construct a 
systematic, coherent and radical theory of the contemporary world order, and to discard 
those aspects which (through being vague, contradictory, simplistic or misleading) cannot 
or should not be incorporated within the theoretical framework of the ‘radical law project’. 
 
The requirement that the resulting theory be systematic has meant that all aspects of the 
global legal order have had to be investigated: its form, content, function and structure, as 
well as its relationship to politics (in the form of the state) and the economy.  The 
requirement that the resulting theory be coherent has necessitated a clear and consistent 
narrative structure able to tie together the particular arguments in each section as well as a 
conceptual perspective broad enough to tackle the disparate aspects of the total global 
social formation without reducing one to another, and has meant that each account used 
has had to be analysed carefully in order to ensure the compatibility of its insights with the 
conceptual framework as a whole.  The requirement that the resulting theory be radical has 
meant that, rather than accepting the common understandings, formal doctrines and surface 
manifestations which form the basis of much orthodox international law scholarship, this 
thesis has had to delve right to the very root of the matter and uncover the hidden 
assumptions, informal networks and underlying logics of the global legal order. 
 
Insights have been drawn from a number of different theorists working within a wide 
variety of different traditions (including American Legal Realism, French Structuralism, 
World Polity Theory and Pashukanite and Gramscian Marxism) spread across orthodox 
and Marxian, domestic and international, legal, political and economic scholarship.  The 
consequent combinations have at times been intuitive and at times counterintuitive and 
have required varying degrees of analysis to clarify their (in)consistencies.  While each 103 
 
insight has been of value in constructing the conceptual framework outlined above, some 
insights are ‘more equal than others’: especially valuable to this study of international law 
have been those provided by Marxists (in particular Gramsci, Althusser, Lukács and 
Poulantzas) better known for their contributions to domestic legal and political criticism. 
 
To  be  able  to  appreciate  what  these  theorists  are  able  to  contribute  to  the  ‘radical 
international  law  project’  it  has  been  necessary  not  simply  to  employ  the  ‘domestic 
analogy’ characteristic of so much international law scholarship, but to reject completely 
the a priori distinction between the domestic and international legal fields so common 
within orthodox legal scholarship on both sides of the divide.  This has been facilitated, 
primarily, by the introduction of the concept of transnationality and an analysis of the 
phenomenon of reification, and that it has been possible has lent support to the idea that 
the resulting theory can have a wider application than those it seeks to supersede. 
 
The product 
 
What, then, have these investigations, analyses and examinations revealed?  What does this 
radical conceptual framework which is under construction look like, and what benefit does 
it have over the orthodox alternatives? 
 
The first thing discovered was that orthodox scholarship has three main explanations of the 
legal form (rules, process or regime), all of which have serious empirical and theoretical 
problems (which are only amplified when attempts are made to synthesise them) and lack 
the  necessary  explanatory  power  to  capture  the  nature  of  what  international  law  is.  
Marxian scholarship, on the other hand, is able to provide an account which avoids these 
problems.  In order to formulate this account it was necessary to begin with Pashukanis’ 
insight that the legal relationship that sits behind the legal rule is the key element of Law, 
recognise the implications of Miéville’s reproblematisation of the notion of ‘legality’ and 
his focus on disputation between legal actors for the different types of relationships which 
require invesigation, incorporate Lukács account of reification to understand how formal 
laws appear to affect one another, and apply Althusser’s distinction between power and 
apparatus to provide the conceptual space for the existence and role of legal (and other) 
institutions in the global legal order.  It is the resulting account of international law – a 
complex  network  of  relationships,  reified  as  rules,  between  legal  subjects,  mediated 104 
 
through institutions, interwoven with the logic of commodity production and exchange – 
which provides the core of this thesis. 
 
Building  upon  this  analysis,  this  thesis  then  attempted  to  construct  an  account  of  the 
structure of the global legal order.  During this process, it became clear that orthodox and 
even some Marxian scholarship (notably the Pashukanite tradition so central to the earlier 
analysis) proceeds from an impoverished understanding of the nature of ‘the State’.  In 
order  to  transcend  this,  it  was  necessary  to  examine  in  detail  Althusser’s  theory  of 
apparatuses,  turn  (temporarily)  to  the  classical  Marxist  definition  of  the  state  and  the 
historical analysis of Teschke before dealing explicitly with the contemporary dynamics of 
the global legal order as described, primarily, by Hardt and Negri.  What a study of these 
dynamics revealed was that Chimni’s proposition that we conceptualise that order as a 
‘nascent  (imperial)  global  state’  not  only  provides  the  basis  on  which  to  apply  an 
Althusserian analytical schema to international law (and thus link this part of the theory to 
the earlier enquiry into the legal form) and corresponds to the more concrete analyses 
offered by Stiglitz, Beckfield and others, but also allows for the strategic integration of 
class analysis.  The importance of the transnationality of the class structure of the global 
state was highlighted in particular by Klein, Rasulov and, again, Lukács.  When the global 
state was viewed as a class state of the sort analysed by Poulantzas (even more radically 
than  the  classical  Marxist  account,  as  the  material  condensation  of  the  interactions  of 
transnational classes within a complex and multi-level institutional structure) the three-
way link amongst the functioning of the global legal, political and economic orders became 
clear. 
 
Thereafter, the focus moved to analysing how the legal form is imbued with content and 
showing how the capitalist (class) relations which constitute the global economy become 
inscribed  in  the  international  legal  order  in  ways  mediated  by  that  order’s  internal 
structure.  It became clear that this analysis required a rejection of instrumentalism as an 
explanatory framework in favour of an account which incorporates the concept, and is thus 
able to recognise the phenomenon, of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the legal and economic 
spheres.  The importance of the epistemological (and ontological) separation of ‘Law/law’ 
into  its  component  parts  which  began  in  the  earlier  analysis  of  the  legal  form  was 
highlighted by the inclusion of insights gained from an engagement with the  works of 
Stone,  Kennedy  and  Ticktin  aimed  at  exploring  how  the  essential  relations  of  the 
contemporary global capitalist order are expressed in concrete norms and legal decision-105 
 
making practices.  This not only contributed to a greater understanding of how content and 
structure  are  related,  but  also  how  international  law  can  be  both  determined  by,  and 
constitutive of, the global economy. 
 
 
Next steps for analysis 
 
As indicated in the introduction, this chapter has so far sought to tie together the analytical 
strands in those that preceded it into one cohesive whole.  However, given the scale of the 
‘radical  international  law  project’,  to  offer  more  than  a  prolegomenal  sketch  of  the 
resulting theory would be a major undertaking in which a thesis of this length could not 
hope to be comprehensive while maintaining the necessary robustness of analysis.  This is 
the reason why the title – Examining (International Law): Towards a Systematic, Coherent 
and Radical Theory – contains that crucial word ‘towards’.  This thesis is intended to 
‘point the way’.  In order to progress further, however, it will be necessary to ‘flesh out’ 
the above analysis in a number of ways. 
 
Firstly, more detailed studies of particular fields within both domestic and international 
law – incorporating not only theory but also doctrine, empirical social reseearch and the 
‘black-letter’ law of cases and contracts, treaties and textbooks – are needed to show how 
transnational class relations are differently materialised in each and how each contributes 
to the overall functioning of the global capitalist order.  Secondly, more thorough critical 
accounts of the historical development of these fields – rather than broad histories ‘of Scots 
Law’ or ‘of international law’ – are needed to show how both national and international 
law have developed in tandem with global capitalism and in each stage of its evolution has 
performed  varying,  but  always  crucial,  functions.  Thirdly,  more  self-conscious 
consideration of the multiform debates, traditions and rifts within Marxian scholarship 
and the effects of the resultant tensions on the generation of a coherent theory is needed to 
understand how the ‘radical international law project’ might avoid becoming mired in the 
minutiae of these while still doing justice to the complexity of the conceptual landscape in 
which it is situated.  Fourthly, more in-depth analysis of all branches and levels of the legal 
profession (in the wider sense argued for above) is needed to show how, despite the legal 
realist  critique  of  determinate  legal  decision-making,  Marxian  analyses  (more  often 
associated with abstract concepts and general social forces) can still yield useful insights 106 
 
into  concrete  and  particular  situations.    Finally,  a  greater  volume  of  work  addressing 
(within the bounds of both domestic and international legal scholarship, rather than as a 
separate concern/field) the issues of transnationality and the place of individuals and other 
non-state actors in the legal order is needed to show how rejecting the assumptions of 
orthodox theory can shine new light on existing problems and provide more theoretically 
satisfying and practically useful solutions. 
 
 
Final remarks 
 
At the core of this  thesis,  and the ‘radical  international  law project’ as  a whole is  an 
exceedingly uncomplicated but (or, perhaps, therefore) vital impulse which, for a number 
of reasons, orthodox scholars either lack or edit out of their work.  That impulse is the one 
which drives one to go beyond mere description, to do more than simply highlight and 
document  the  various  injustices  wrought  by  the  contemporary  global  capitalist  system 
(both in contravention of and through law) and, instead, to seek to change the system.
401  
In order to be able to do so, it is necessary to ask, continually and tirelessly: 
 
“Why is this thus?  What is the reason of this thusness?”
402 
 
It is, therefore, the answering of these questions to which preceding analysis was directed. 
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